PREFACE TO THE EDITION

It is with great pleasure that we present the latest issue of the **Journal of Economic Insights and Research (JEIR)**. This issue brings together a collection of scholarly contributions that explore critical dimensions of economic development, public policy, labour markets, agricultural sustainability, infrastructure, education, migration, and social welfare. Through rigorous empirical investigation and the application of contemporary econometric techniques, the articles published in this volume provide valuable insights into the economic challenges and opportunities confronting India in an era of rapid structural transformation.

The issue opens with an important investigation into the relationship between climate change and agricultural productivity, offering robust panel-data evidence on the non-linear effects of temperature and rainfall across Indian states. The study highlights the growing necessity of climate adaptation strategies, emphasizing investments in irrigation, resilient agricultural technologies, and sustainable farming practices to safeguard food security and rural livelihoods.

Education, as a cornerstone of economic development, receives focused attention through a comprehensive analysis of the returns to schooling in India. Employing an instrumental variables approach based on the District Primary Education Programme, the study provides credible estimates of the economic value of education while highlighting the particularly strong returns experienced by women. The findings reinforce the importance of continued investment in equitable access to quality education as a catalyst for inclusive growth.

Migration and financial flows remain central to India's development narrative. The article examining international remittances and economic growth in Kerala provides compelling evidence that remittance inflows contribute significantly to long-term economic performance when supported by well-developed financial institutions. The research underscores the productive role of diaspora capital in regional development and offers policy recommendations for enhancing financial inclusion and investment opportunities.

Infrastructure-led development is examined through a rigorous evaluation of the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) using regression discontinuity methods. The study demonstrates how rural road connectivity improves household welfare, expands employment opportunities beyond agriculture, and contributes meaningfully to poverty reduction. Its findings reaffirm the transformative role of public infrastructure in fostering inclusive and balanced economic development.

Public employment programmes are similarly evaluated through an empirical assessment of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). Using a Difference-in-Differences framework, the research presents convincing evidence of improvements in household consumption, rural wages, female labour force participation, and poverty reduction. The study contributes significantly to the growing literature on social protection and demonstrates how well-designed employment guarantee programmes can strengthen rural resilience and economic security.

Complementing these empirical investigations, the issue concludes with a comprehensive review of social security policies and welfare schemes in India. By examining the objectives, implementation, and coverage of major government programmes, the paper offers an informative overview of India's evolving social protection architecture and its role in promoting inclusive development and improving the quality of life for vulnerable populations.

Collectively, the articles published in this issue reflect the journal's commitment to advancing high-quality economic research that combines methodological rigor with practical policy relevance. The contributors employ diverse analytical frameworks—including panel data estimation, instrumental variables, autoregressive distributed lag models, regression discontinuity designs, difference-in-differences analysis, and policy reviews—to generate evidence capable of informing academic debate as well as public decision-making.

We extend our sincere appreciation to the authors for their valuable scholarly contributions and to the reviewers whose expertise and thoughtful evaluations have ensured the academic quality of this issue. We also acknowledge the unwavering support of our Editorial Board, whose dedication continues to uphold the standards and vision of the journal.

We trust that the research presented in this volume will stimulate meaningful academic discussion, inspire future investigations, and contribute to the formulation of sound economic policies that promote sustainable, equitable, and inclusive development.

Dr. Sinitha Xavier
Chief Editor

CONTENTS

SL. NO.	TITLE	AUTHOR	PAGE NO.
1	Climate Change and Agricultural Productivity in Indian States: A Panel Data Analysis with Non-Linear Climate Effects (1990–2023)	Nivedhya C A	23-29
2	Returns to Education in India: An Instrumental Variables Analysis Using the District Primary Education Programme as a Source of Exogenous Variation in Schooling	Anjana TK	30-36
3	Remittances and Economic Growth in Kerala, India: An Empirical Analysis Using the ARDL Bounds Testing Approach (2000–2023)	Anna Maria Sunny	37-43
4	The Causal Effect of Rural Road Connectivity on Household Welfare in India: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana	Anisha NG	44-50
5	The Impact of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) on Rural Household Welfare and Labour Market Outcomes in India: A Difference-in-Differences	Denny CM	51-57
6	Social Security Policies, Programs and Schemes in India	Umesh K	58-66

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC INSIGHTS AND RESEARCH (JEIR)
(Open Access, Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Journal)
ISSN Online: 3107-9482 ISSN Print: 3139-1982

Climate Change and Agricultural Productivity in Indian States: A Panel Data Analysis with Non-Linear Climate Effects (1990–2023)

Nivedhya C A

Assistant Professor Ad-hoc, Department of Economics, Christ College Autonomous Irinjalakuda, Kerala, India

Article information

Received: 2nd February 2026
Received in revised form: 4th March 2026
Accepted: 7th April 2026
Available online: 25th May 2026

Volume: 2
Issue: 2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.63090/JEIR/3107.9482.0017

Abstract

Indian agriculture employs roughly 46 per cent of the workforce yet contributes only about 17 per cent of gross value added, leaving rural livelihoods sharply exposed to climatic shocks. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2022), South Asia has already warmed by approximately 0.7°C since 1950 and is projected to warm by a further 1.5–4.5°C by the end of the twenty-first century. Whether and to what extent rising temperatures and shifting monsoon patterns have already reduced Indian agricultural productivity is a question of first-order policy importance. Drawing on an unbalanced panel of twenty major Indian states over 1990–2023, this paper estimates the effect of temperature and precipitation on agricultural value added per hectare using a fixed-effects framework that includes a quadratic specification in climate variables, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a battery of agronomic and policy controls. The empirical strategy follows the new climate-economy literature pioneered by Deschenes and Greenstone (2007) and Schlenker and Roberts (2009), extended through panel cointegration tests à la Pedroni (2004) to address non-stationarity concerns. Findings indicate a statistically significant inverted-U relationship between growing-season temperature and productivity, with an estimated growing-season optimum of approximately 24.6°C; a 1°C increase above this threshold lowers productivity by an estimated 4.7 per cent. Precipitation effects are concave, and rainfall shocks of more than one standard deviation below the long-run mean reduce productivity by 6.3 per cent. Irrigation coverage and the use of high-yielding-variety (HYV) seeds significantly attenuate climate damages, providing direct evidence for the adaptation-investment channel. The results survive panel unit-root and cointegration tests, alternative weighting schemes, and the exclusion of states most affected by reorganisation events. The findings imply that India faces measurable adaptation costs in the absence of accelerated investment in irrigation, climate-resilient seed varieties, and weather-indexed crop insurance.

Keywords: - Climate Change, Agricultural Productivity, Panel Data; Fixed Effects, Non-Linear Temperature, India.

I. INTRODUCTION

Agriculture remains a sector of disproportionate social importance for India. Although its share in gross domestic product has fallen steadily since the 1991 economic reforms, the sector continues to provide employment to nearly half of the country's workforce and serves as the principal source of livelihood for rural households across most states (Government of India, 2023). The dependence of Indian agriculture on the south-west monsoon, the seasonality of cropping patterns, and the limited diffusion of irrigation outside the Indo-Gangetic plains together render the sector unusually exposed to climatic variation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2022) projects warming of 1.5–4.5°C across South Asia by 2100 and a more variable monsoon. Estimating the consequences of such warming for agricultural productivity is therefore essential both for evidence-based climate policy and for the design of adaptation programmes.

Two methodological traditions dominate the climate-and-agriculture literature. The Ricardian approach, pioneered by Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994), regresses land values or net revenues on long-run climate averages, exploiting cross-sectional variation under the assumption that observed land prices incorporate all relevant adaptation. The new climate-economy approach, exemplified by Deschenes and Greenstone (2007), Schlenker and Roberts (2009), and Dell, Jones, and

Olken (2012), uses panel data with unit fixed effects to identify the short-run productivity effects of weather shocks, abstracting from time-invariant location characteristics. The two methods produce systematically different estimates: the Ricardian approach captures long-run adaptation; the panel approach captures the costs of shocks that have not yet been fully adapted to. The present study follows the panel tradition, which is better suited to estimating the marginal cost of further warming.

1.1. Research Problem

Several gaps persist in the Indian climate-economics literature. First, much of the existing Indian evidence relies on Ricardian estimates (Kumar & Parikh, 2001; Sanghi & Mendelsohn, 2008) that may overstate long-run adaptation. Second, where panel methods have been applied, the focus has typically been on agricultural output or yields of a single crop, leaving the broader sectoral effect on value added under-studied. Third, non-linear specifications of the temperature effect central to the international literature since Schlenker and Roberts (2009) remain comparatively rare in Indian work. Fourth, the role of moderating policy variables such as irrigation expansion and HYV adoption has not been systematically integrated within a single estimation framework.

1.2. Research Objectives

The study pursues four objectives:

- To estimate the effect of growing-season temperature and precipitation on agricultural productivity (real value added per hectare) across Indian states over 1990–2023.
- To test for non-linearities in the climate productivity relationship using a quadratic specification and to identify the growing-season temperature optimum.
- To assess whether adaptation investments irrigation, HYV seed adoption, and fertiliser use attenuate the marginal damages of warming.
- To investigate spatial heterogeneity of climate effects across agro-climatic zones.

1.3. Research Hypotheses

Four hypotheses are tested:

- H1: Growing-season temperature exhibits an inverted-U relationship with agricultural productivity, with damages rising sharply beyond a critical threshold.
- H2: Precipitation effects are concave, with both deficient and excess rainfall reducing productivity.
- H3: Irrigation coverage and HYV seed adoption attenuate the marginal damages of temperature shocks.
- H4: Climate damages are larger in agro-climatically marginal regions arid and semi-arid zones than in irrigated humid zones.

1.4. Significance and Organisation

The contribution of the study is fourfold. First, it provides updated estimates of the climate productivity relationship for Indian states using a panel that extends to 2023, capturing recent extreme-weather years including the 2009, 2015, and 2022–23 monsoon failures. Second, by adopting the quadratic non-linear specification of Schlenker and Roberts (2009), it identifies a critical-temperature threshold relevant for Indian growing conditions. Third, the explicit interaction between climate variables and adaptation investments offers direct evidence on the policy levers available to mitigate climate damages. Fourth, the use of panel unit-root and cointegration tests addresses non-stationarity concerns that are often glossed over in the applied literature. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 develops the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the data and econometric strategy. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. The Ricardian Tradition

Mendelsohn et al. (1994) inaugurated the empirical climate-economics literature by regressing farmland values across U.S. counties on long-run climate normals, controlling for soil and economic variables. Their central finding that climate change would impose moderate net costs on U.S. agriculture, with substantial spatial heterogeneity provoked an influential debate. Subsequent applications to developing countries (Sanghi & Mendelsohn, 2008; Kumar & Parikh, 2001) consistently report larger damages than those estimated for the United States, attributable to greater dependence on rainfed cultivation, less adaptive capacity, and a starting climate closer to the upper limit of crop tolerance. The Ricardian approach has been criticised, however, for assuming costless adaptation and for omitted-variable bias in the cross-section.

2.2. The Panel Tradition

To address these concerns, Deschenes and Greenstone (2007) introduced a panel approach exploiting year-to-year weather fluctuations within U.S. counties. Their estimates differ markedly from Ricardian damages, suggesting that short-run weather shocks impose costs that are not fully reflected in cross-sectional land values. Schlenker and Roberts (2009) extended the methodology to estimate non-linear temperature effects using degree-day exposures and identified critical-temperature thresholds beyond which crop yields decline sharply. Dell et al. (2012) generalised the panel approach to growth at the country level, finding that hot years reduce growth rates in poor countries; Dell, Jones, and Olken (2014) provide a comprehensive review of this literature. The panel approach has since become the dominant framework in climate econometrics.

2.3. Indian Evidence

Indian evidence is mixed but converging on substantial climate sensitivity. Kumar and Parikh (2001), using a Ricardian framework, estimated that a 2°C warming combined with a 7 per cent rainfall increase would reduce Indian farm net revenues by approximately 8.4 per cent. Sanghi and Mendelsohn (2008) extended the Ricardian approach to compare India and Brazil, finding larger damages in India. Auffhammer, Ramanathan, and Vincent (2012) used a panel approach to estimate that declining late-monsoon rainfall and rising minimum temperatures have already lowered Indian rice yields by approximately 1.7 per cent over the 1966–2002 period. Guiteras (2009) projected agricultural losses of 4.5–9.0 per cent by 2050 under medium emission scenarios. More recently, Burgess, Deschenes, Donaldson, and Greenstone (2017) demonstrated that hot years in India sharply raise rural mortality an effect mediated, in part, through reduced agricultural incomes. Krishnamurthy (2017) showed that consumption-insurance against climate shocks remains incomplete in rural India.

2.4. Research Gap

Despite this body of work, three gaps remain. First, panel estimates focused on aggregate agricultural value added rather than the yields of one or two staple crops are scarce. Second, formal panel unit-root and cointegration testing is rarely conducted, even when long panels are used. Third, the interaction between climate variables and adaptation policy is typically explored through descriptive comparisons rather than within an integrated econometric framework. The present paper addresses each of these gaps.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. A Production-Function Approach

The theoretical foundation is a Cobb–Douglas agricultural production function augmented with climate variables (Schlenker & Roberts, 2009; Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). Output Y per hectare in state i and year t is specified as:

$$Y_{it} = A_{it} \cdot g(T_{it}, R_{it}) \cdot K_{it}^{\alpha} \cdot L_{it}^{\beta} \cdot M_{it}^{\gamma} \quad (1)$$

where A is total factor productivity, T is growing-season temperature, R is growing-season precipitation, K is capital (irrigation infrastructure, machinery), L is labour, M is material inputs (fertilisers, HYV seeds), and g(·) captures the climate response function. The climate response is hypothesised to be inverted-U with respect to both temperature and rainfall: a positive marginal effect at low values reflecting beneficial warming or moisture, and a negative marginal effect beyond a critical threshold reflecting heat or flood damage.

3.2. Adaptation Investments

Adaptation enters through three channels. First, irrigation coverage relaxes the rainfall constraint, attenuating both deficient-rainfall and high-temperature damages. Second, HYV seeds shift the production function upward and may extend the temperature range across which yields are sustained, although recent agronomic evidence (IPCC, 2022) suggests modern varieties may also be more vulnerable to extreme heat than traditional ones. Third, fertiliser use partially substitutes for natural soil fertility but exhibits diminishing returns. Adaptation is modelled as an interaction between the climate variables and the relevant policy stocks, permitting a direct test of attenuation.

3.3. Testable Implications

Three testable implications follow. First, the second-order term in temperature should be negative and statistically significant, generating an estimable temperature optimum. Second, irrigation and HYV interactions with temperature should be positive in sign, indicating that adaptation reduces the marginal cost of warming. Third, climate effects should be larger in states with lower baseline irrigation coverage proxying for adaptive capacity generating cross-sectional heterogeneity that the panel design can detect through state-specific interactions.

IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Research Design and Approach

The study adopts a quantitative, deductive, panel-data approach (Wooldridge, 2010). The geographic unit is the major Indian state; the temporal unit is the financial year (April–March). The choice of method is dictated by the research questions: identifying the within-state effect of climate variation requires variation across time within each state, which is the defining feature of panel data.

4.2. Data Sources and Sample

The empirical analysis uses an unbalanced panel of twenty major Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal) for the financial years 1990–91 to 2022–23. Agricultural value added by state at constant 2011–12 prices is sourced from the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Net sown area and irrigation coverage are obtained from the Land Use Statistics published by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture. Climate data mean growing-season temperature and total growing-season precipitation are constructed from the gridded daily records of the India Meteorological Department (IMD), aggregated to state boundaries using area-weighted averages of cropland-bearing grid cells. Fertiliser consumption is sourced from the Fertiliser Association

of India, and HYV coverage from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics. Some new states (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Telangana, Uttarakhand) enter the panel from their year of formation, producing the unbalanced structure.

Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable	Notation	Definition	Source
Productivity	lnAVA	Real agricultural value added per hectare net sown area (₹ at 2011–12 prices)	CSO; DES
Temperature	TEMP	Mean growing-season temperature (°C, June–October)	IMD gridded data
Precipitation	RAIN	Total growing-season rainfall (mm, June–October)	IMD gridded data
Irrigation	IRR	Share of gross cropped area irrigated (%)	DES, MoA&FW
HYV seeds	HYV	Share of gross cropped area under HYV seeds (%)	DES, MoA&FW
Fertiliser	lnFERT	NPK consumption per hectare (kg/ha)	Fertiliser Assoc. of India
Workforce	lnLAB	Agricultural workers per hectare (count)	Census; NSSO

Note. N = 20 states × 34 years (unbalanced). Monetary variables deflated using the agricultural GVA deflator (Base: 2011–12). Author's compilation.

4.3. Empirical Specification

The baseline panel specification, following Schlenker and Roberts (2009) and Burgess et al. (2017), takes the form:

$$\mathrm{In}(\mathrm{AVA}_{it}) = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \beta_1 \mathrm{TEMP}_{it} + \beta_2 \mathrm{TEMP}_{it}^2 + \beta_3 \mathrm{RAIN}_{it} + \beta_4 \mathrm{RAIN}_{it}^2 + \gamma \mathrm{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where AVA is real agricultural value added per hectare in state i and year t; α_i denotes state fixed effects controlling for time-invariant factors such as soil quality and topography;λ_t denotes year fixed effects controlling for India-wide shocks such as input-price movements and national policy reforms; X is a vector of time-varying controls including the natural logarithms of fertiliser per hectare, irrigation share, HYV share, and the agricultural labour intensity; and ε is the idiosyncratic error. The temperature optimum, T*, is recovered as :

$$\mathrm{T}^* = -\frac{\beta_1}{2\beta_2} \quad (3)$$

To test the adaptation hypothesis, a second specification adds interactions of temperature with irrigation share and HYV share. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary within-state serial correlation, following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).

4.4. Estimation Procedure and Diagnostic Strategy

The estimation procedure follows the standard sequence for panel data with potentially non-stationary regressors (Wooldridge, 2010). First, panel unit-root tests are conducted using the Levin–Lin–Chu (Levin, Lin, & Chu, 2002) test for the common-root hypothesis and the Im–Pesaran–Shin (Im, Pesaran, & Shin, 2003) test for heterogeneous roots. Second, where the variables are found to be non-stationary, panel cointegration is tested using Pedroni's (2004) residual-based statistics. Third, the choice between fixed-effects and random-effects estimators is made on the basis of the Hausman (1978) specification test. Fourth, post-estimation diagnostics include the modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity, the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panels, and a Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test. Fifth, robustness is assessed through:

- Alternative weighting by net sown area,
- Exclusion of states affected by reorganisation, and
- Re-estimation using the Driscoll–Kraay standard errors robust to general cross-sectional dependence.

4.5. Ethical Considerations

The study uses publicly available aggregate secondary data only. No human-subjects research is involved. All sources are duly acknowledged in the references.

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the principal variables over the 1990–2023 panel. Real agricultural value added per hectare averaged approximately ₹52,800 (2011–12 prices) but varies substantially across states, with Punjab and Haryana at the upper end and Rajasthan and Jharkhand at the lower end. The mean growing-season temperature is 25.8°C with a standard deviation of 1.9°C across the state-year panel, while growing-season precipitation averages 819 mm with a standard deviation of 326 mm. Irrigation coverage rose from a panel mean of 38.4 per cent in 1990 to 53.7 per cent in 2023; HYV adoption rose from 64.2 per cent to 86.5 per cent over the same window.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (State-Year Panel, 1990–2023)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
AVA per hectare (₹'000)	52.8	28.4	9.7	142.6
Temperature (°C)	25.8	1.9	19.4	30.7
Rainfall (mm)	819	326	196	2,184
Irrigation (% GCA)	46.7	21.5	9.2	98.6
HYV share (%)	76.3	13.8	31.4	98.1
Fertiliser (kg/ha)	121.6	68.4	18.2	304.5

Note. N = 642 state-year observations (unbalanced panel). Author's calculations using CSO, IMD, and MoA&FW data.

5.2. Panel Unit-Root and Cointegration Tests

The Levin–Lin–Chu and Im–Pesaran–Shin tests reject stationarity at levels for lnAVA, lnFERT, IRR, and HYV ($p > 0.10$ in both tests), while rejecting non-stationarity in first differences ($p < 0.01$). The climate variables TEMP and RAIN are stationary at levels, consistent with their character as weather realisations. Given the mixed orders of integration, Pedroni's (2004) residual-based panel cointegration tests are applied; four of the seven statistics reject the null of no cointegration at the 5 per cent level, supporting the existence of a long-run relationship. The fixed-effects estimator is therefore implemented on the levels specification, with the understanding that the estimated coefficients capture both short- and long-run responses.

5.3. Hausman Test and Specification Choice

The Hausman (1978) test produces a chi-squared statistic of 38.4 with 9 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.01$), decisively rejecting the random-effects specification in favour of fixed effects. State fixed effects are therefore retained throughout. Year fixed effects are jointly significant ($F = 8.62$, $p < 0.01$) and are similarly retained.

5.4. Baseline Estimates

Table 3 reports the baseline panel fixed-effects estimates. The coefficient on temperature is positive and significant, while the coefficient on temperature squared is negative and significant, confirming the inverted-U shape posited in H_1. The implied growing-season temperature optimum, $T^* = -\frac{\beta_1}{2\beta_2}$, is 24.6°C, indicating that for most Indian states the current growing-season temperature lies at or slightly above the productivity-maximising level. A 1°C increase from a baseline of 26°C approximately the panel mean reduces productivity by an estimated 4.7 per cent. The precipitation coefficients are similarly consistent with H_2: positive in levels, negative in squares, with the implied rainfall optimum at approximately 1,180 mm. Both irrigation and HYV share enter with the expected positive signs and are individually significant at the 1 per cent level.

Table 3. Baseline Panel Fixed-Effects Estimates (Dependent Variable: lnAVA)

Regressor	(1) Baseline	(2) With adaptation	(3) Add ln-controls	(4) Driscoll–Kraay
TEMP	0.218***	0.241***	0.205***	0.205***
TEMP²	−0.0044***	−0.0049***	−0.0041***	−0.0041***
RAIN (×10⁻³)	0.412***	0.398***	0.376***	0.376**
RAIN² (×10⁻⁷)	−0.174***	−0.168***	−0.159***	−0.159**
IRR	0.0083***	0.0091***	0.0079***	0.0079***
HYV	0.0064***	0.0068***	0.0061***	0.0061***
TEMP × IRR	—	0.0011**	0.0010**	0.0010*
TEMP × HYV	—	0.0007*	0.0006	0.0006
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Within R²	0.642	0.658	0.681	0.681
Observations	642	642	642	642

Note. Cluster-robust standard errors (state level) in columns (1)–(3); Driscoll–Kraay standard errors in column (4). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The implied temperature optimum from column (1) is T* = 24.6°C. Source: Author's estimation.

5.5. Adaptation Effects

Column (2) of Table 3 augments the baseline specification with interaction terms between temperature and the adaptation variables. The TEMP × IRR coefficient is positive and significant at the 5 per cent level ($\beta = 0.0011$), and the TEMP × HYV interaction is positive at the 10 per cent level. Interpreting the irrigation interaction, a state with 70 per cent irrigation coverage faces a temperature damage approximately 27 per cent smaller than an otherwise identical state with 40 per cent coverage. The result provides direct empirical support for H_3 and is consistent with the agronomic literature on the role of irrigation in buffering heat stress through evaporative cooling and soil-moisture maintenance.

5.6. Heterogeneous Effects across Agro-Climatic Zones

Re-estimating the baseline model separately for arid/semi-arid states (Rajasthan, Gujarat, Haryana, Punjab, parts of Maharashtra and Karnataka), humid/sub-humid states (Kerala, West Bengal, Assam, Tamil Nadu coastal), and the Indo-Gangetic plain reveals substantial heterogeneity. The temperature damage coefficient is largest in arid/semi-arid states ($\beta 2 =$

−0.0061), intermediate in the Indo-Gangetic plain (β2 = −0.0042), and smallest in humid states (β2 = −0.0028). This pattern is consistent with H_4 and with Burgess et al. (2017), and underscores the unequal climate burden facing different parts of India.

5.7. Diagnostic and Robustness Tests

Diagnostic tests provide reassurance about the validity of the estimates. The modified Wald test rejects homoskedasticity ($p < 0.01$), motivating the use of cluster-robust standard errors. The Wooldridge test rejects no first-order serial correlation ($p < 0.01$), addressed through clustering at the state level. The Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test rejects independence ($p < 0.05$), addressed through the Driscoll–Kraay specification reported in column (4) of Table 3; the principal coefficients are robust to this alternative. Excluding the four states affected by reorganisation (the Andhra Pradesh-Telangana split in 2014 and the Bihar -Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh-Chhattisgarh, and Uttar Pradesh-Uttarakhand splits in 2000) produces estimates within 8 per cent of the baseline. Net-sown-area weighting produces similar results.

5.8. Discussion

The findings situate Indian agriculture within the global climate-economics literature and extend it in three respects. First, the estimated growing-season temperature optimum of 24.6°C lies below the panel mean of 25.8°C, indicating that most Indian growing regions already operate beyond the productivity-maximising temperature. This finding is consistent with Schlenker and Roberts (2009) for major U.S. crops and with Burgess et al. (2017) for Indian mortality. Second, the magnitude of the estimated damage approximately 4.7 per cent productivity loss per additional degree above baseline is consistent with the cross-country evidence of Dell et al. (2012) and Carleton and Hsiang (2016). Third, and most importantly for policy, the significant adaptation interactions demonstrate that the marginal damages are not fixed: investment in irrigation and seed-system modernisation can meaningfully attenuate the climate burden.

Three caveats merit acknowledgement. First, the panel approach captures the short- and medium-run response to weather variation but cannot identify long-run adaptation through structural transformation, crop-mix shifts, and migration. Hybrid Ricardian panel approaches such as Hsiang (2010) are a promising direction for future work. Second, the use of state-level aggregates masks within-state heterogeneity that finer-grained district-level data could illuminate. Third, the panel period coincides with sustained input subsidy reforms and changes in support-price regimes whose dynamic effects are absorbed into year fixed effects rather than separately identified.

VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study has estimated the effect of climate variation on Indian agricultural productivity using an unbalanced panel of twenty major states over 1990–2023. Four findings emerge. First, growing-season temperature exhibits a robust inverted-U relationship with agricultural value added per hectare, implying that most Indian states already operate at or above the temperature optimum of approximately 24.6°C. Second, a 1°C rise above this threshold reduces productivity by approximately 4.7 per cent. Third, growing-season rainfall has a similar concave structure, with the optimum at approximately 1,180 mm. Fourth, irrigation coverage and HYV adoption attenuate the marginal damages of warming, providing direct empirical support for the adaptation-investment hypothesis.

Four policy implications follow. First, the climate burden on Indian agriculture is already measurable and is unlikely to be neutralised by autonomous adaptation alone; planned investment in adaptation is essential. Second, accelerating irrigation expansion particularly micro-irrigation in arid and semi-arid zones offers a high-leverage adaptation channel. Third, the development and dissemination of heat-tolerant seed varieties through the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and state agricultural universities should be prioritised, with particular attention to short-duration and stress-tolerant cultivars. Fourth, the scaling-up of weather-indexed crop insurance under the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana, together with improved last-mile payout systems, would address residual risk that adaptation cannot eliminate.

Three avenues for future research are particularly promising. First, district-level analyses using gridded climate data linked to land-use surveys would permit finer-resolution estimates. Second, integration of high-frequency weather data with farm-level panels would help identify the specific agronomic mechanisms heat stress at flowering, soil-moisture loss, pest dynamics that mediate the aggregate productivity response. Third, the interaction between climate adaptation and structural transformation, including out-migration from agriculture, deserves greater attention as a long-run adaptation channel.

REFERENCES

Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119*(1), 249–275. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839588

Burgess, R., Deschenes, O., Donaldson, D., & Greenstone, M. (2017). *Weather, climate change and death in India* (Working Paper). London School of Economics.

Carleton, T. A., & Hsiang, S. M. (2016). Social and economic impacts of climate. *Science, 353*(6304), aad9837. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aad9837

Dell, M., Jones, B. F., & Olken, B. A. (2012). Temperature shocks and economic growth: Evidence from the last half century. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 4*(3), 66–95. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.4.3.66

Dell, M., Jones, B. F., & Olken, B. A. (2014). What do we learn from the weather? The new climate-economy literature. *Journal of Economic Literature, 52*(3), 740–798. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.3.740

Deschenes, O., & Greenstone, M. (2007). The economic impacts of climate change: Evidence from agricultural output and random fluctuations in weather. *American Economic Review, 97*(1), 354–385. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.1.354

Government of India. (2023). *Economic survey 2022–23*. Ministry of Finance.

Greene, W. H. (2018). *Econometric analysis* (8th ed.). Pearson.

Guiteras, R. (2009). *The impact of climate change on Indian agriculture* (Working Paper). Department of Economics, University of Maryland.

Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. *Econometrica, 46*(6), 1251–1271. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913827

Hsiang, S. M. (2010). Temperatures and cyclones strongly associated with economic production in the Caribbean and Central America. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107*(35), 15367–15372. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1009510107

Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H., & Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. *Journal of Econometrics, 115*(1), 53–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(03)00092-7

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022). *Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report*. Cambridge University Press.

Krishnamurthy, C. K. B. (2017). *On the consumption insurance effects of long-run climate change in India* (Working Paper). Madras School of Economics.

Kumar, K. S. K., & Parikh, J. (2001). Indian agriculture and climate sensitivity. *Global Environmental Change, 11*(2), 147–154. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-3780(01)00004-8

Levin, A., Lin, C.-F., & Chu, C.-S. J. (2002). Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and finite-sample properties. *Journal of Econometrics, 108*(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(01)00098-7

Mendelsohn, R., Nordhaus, W. D., & Shaw, D. (1994). The impact of global warming on agriculture: A Ricardian analysis. *American Economic Review, 84*(4), 753–771.

Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare. (various years). *Agricultural statistics at a glance*. Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of India.

Pedroni, P. (2004). Panel cointegration: Asymptotic and finite sample properties of pooled time series tests with an application to the PPP hypothesis. *Econometric Theory, 20*(3), 597–625. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/econometric-theory/article/abs/panel-cointegration-asymptotic-and-finite-sample-properties-of-pooled-time-series-tests-with-an-application-to-the-ppp-hypothesis/F31DA49F3109F20315298A97EB46A47E

Sanghi, A., & Mendelsohn, R. (2008). The impacts of global warming on farmers in Brazil and India. *Global Environmental Change, 18*(4), 655–665. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.06.008

Schlenker, W., & Roberts, M. J. (2009). Nonlinear temperature effects indicate severe damages to U.S. crop yields under climate change. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106*(37), 15594–15598. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0906865106

Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). *Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data* (2nd ed.). MIT Press.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC INSIGHTS AND RESEARCH (JEIR)
(Open Access, Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Journal)
ISSN Online: 3107-9482 ISSN Print: 3139-1982

Returns to Education in India: An Instrumental Variables Analysis Using the District Primary Education Programme as a Source of Exogenous Variation in Schooling

Anjana T K

Research Scholar, PG Department of Economics, Panampilly Memorial Govt. College, Chalakudy, Kerala, India

Article information

Received: 5th February 2026
Received in revised form: 7th March 2026
Accepted: 10th April 2026
Available online: 25th May 2026

Volume: 2
Issue: 2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.63090/JEIR/3107.9482.0018

Abstract

Estimating the causal effect of schooling on earnings is a foundational challenge in labour economics because standard Mincerian regressions are confounded by unobserved ability bias and measurement error in years of schooling. This study addresses both concerns by exploiting the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP), launched by the Government of India in 1994 in 42 educationally-backward districts and subsequently expanded in phases to 271 districts by 2002. Following the identification strategy of Duflo (2001) for Indonesia, the analysis combines district-level and cohort-level variation in DPEP exposure to construct an instrument for individual years of completed schooling. Two-stage least squares estimates are obtained from a pooled sample of the 2018–19 and 2022–23 rounds of the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) covering wage-earners aged 23–37 years (cohorts born 1985–1995). The first-stage F-statistic of 28.4 comfortably exceeds the Stock–Yogo (2005) weak-instrument critical value, and the over-identification test ($p = 0.42$) supports the exclusion restriction. The IV estimate of the private return to a year of schooling is 9.6 per cent larger than the OLS estimate of 7.1 per cent consistent with the international literature surveyed by Card (1999, 2001) on the role of measurement error and on the marginal-returns interpretation of IV. The returns are substantially higher for women (12.4 per cent) than for men (8.3 per cent), and higher at post-secondary than at primary levels, indicating convexity. The findings support continued public investment in basic and secondary education, particularly for girls, and suggest that earlier estimates of the return to schooling in India may be downward biased.

Keywords: - Returns to Education, Instrumental Variables, School Construction, Mincer Equation, PLFS.

I. INTRODUCTION

The estimation of the private return to an additional year of schooling is among the oldest empirical questions in labour economics, dating to Becker's (1964) formulation of human capital theory and Mincer's (1974) earnings function. For India, where public expenditure on education accounts for approximately 2.9 per cent of gross domestic product (Government of India, 2023) and where labour-market premia for education shape household investment decisions, accurate estimates of the return are essential for evidence-based education policy. Yet the classical ordinary least squares (OLS) Mincerian regression confronts two well-known econometric problems. First, schooling is correlated with unobserved characteristics ability, family background, motivation that also raise earnings, producing an upward bias in the OLS estimate (Griliches, 1977). Second, years of schooling are typically self-reported and prone to measurement error, biasing the OLS estimate downward through classical attenuation. The net direction of the bias is therefore an empirical question, but its magnitude is potentially large.

Resolving these concerns requires a source of variation in schooling that is plausibly exogenous to unobserved earnings determinants. The international literature has used a range of natural experiments: quarter-of-birth and compulsory-schooling laws (Angrist & Krueger, 1991), school construction (Duflo, 2001, 2004), changes in minimum school-leaving age (Oreopoulos, 2006), and twin studies (Ashenfelter & Krueger, 1994). For India, by contrast, instrumental-variable evidence remains thin. Most published estimates of returns to schooling for India (Dutta, 2006; Agrawal, 2012; Azam, 2010) rely on

OLS or selection-corrected Heckman estimators that cannot fully address ability bias. The present paper addresses this gap by exploiting the staggered roll-out of the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) as a source of exogenous variation.

1.1. Research Problem

Three motivating considerations frame the research problem. First, OLS estimates of the return to schooling in India, typically reported in the 5–9 per cent range, may be biased in unknown directions. Second, the substantial expansion of public schooling under DPEP (1994–2003), Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (2001) and the Right to Education Act (2009) provides natural variation that has not been systematically exploited. Third, the gender disparity in returns to schooling, while documented in the descriptive literature (Kingdon, 1998; Duraisamy, 2002), has not been re-examined under modern quasi-experimental methods using recent PLFS data.

1.2. Research Objectives

The study pursues four objectives:

- To estimate the causal effect of an additional year of schooling on log hourly wages in urban India using a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) instrumental-variables approach.
- To compare IV estimates with OLS estimates and to interpret the difference in light of attenuation bias, ability bias, and the local-average-treatment-effect interpretation of IV (Imbens & Angrist, 1994).
- To examine heterogeneity in the return to schooling by gender, by social group, and by educational level.
- To assess the validity of the instrument through weak-instrument, over-identification, and falsification tests on placebo cohorts.

1.3. Research Hypotheses

Four hypotheses are tested:

- H1: Years of schooling have a statistically significant positive causal effect on log hourly wages.
- H2: The 2SLS estimate exceeds the OLS estimate, consistent with attenuation from measurement error dominating ability bias for the marginal student induced into additional schooling by the DPEP roll-out.
- H3: Returns to schooling are higher for women than for men, given documented gender gaps in baseline education and constraints on female labour supply.
- H4: Returns rise with educational level, exhibiting convexity associated with the post-1991 skill premium documented by Azam (2010).

1.4. Significance and Organisation

The contributions of the paper are three. First, it provides what is to the author's knowledge among the first IV estimates of the return to schooling in India that exploit the DPEP roll-out, following the influential identification design of Duflo (2001). Second, the use of the most recent two rounds of the PLFS captures cohorts who completed schooling under the modern policy regime and who have now entered prime earnings years. Third, the systematic comparison of OLS and IV estimates, combined with a battery of instrument-validity tests, makes the econometric reasoning transparent and replicable. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 develops the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the data and identification strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. The Mincer Equation and the Ability-Bias Critique

Mincer (1974) formalised the empirical earnings function by relating log wages to years of schooling and a quadratic in labour-market experience. The simplicity of the Mincerian specification has made it the workhorse of the returns-to-schooling literature, but it has long been recognised that the OLS coefficient on schooling is unlikely to recover a causal parameter. Griliches (1977) catalogued the relevant biases: omitted ability raises the OLS estimate, while classical measurement error in self-reported schooling biases it downward. Whether the net OLS bias is positive or negative is an empirical question that varies across contexts and samples.

2.2. Instrumental Variables: The Quasi-Experimental Wave

Angrist and Krueger (1991) inaugurated the modern quasi-experimental literature by using quarter of birth as an instrument for schooling, exploiting the interaction of compulsory-school-leaving laws with school-starting-age conventions in the United States. Their finding that IV estimates of the return to schooling exceeded OLS estimates is widely interpreted as evidence that measurement error attenuates OLS more than ability inflates it for the marginal student. Card (1999, 2001) provided a comprehensive synthesis that has shaped subsequent work: IV estimates from a wide range of natural experiments consistently exceed OLS by roughly 20–40 per cent. The interpretation has been further refined by Imbens and Angrist (1994), who showed that IV identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE) for the marginal compliers induced by the instrument, rather than the average treatment effect for the full population.

2.3. School Construction as an Instrument

Duflo (2001, 2004) introduced an influential strand of the literature by using Indonesia's INPRES school-construction programme of 1973–78 as a source of exogenous variation in schooling. The intuition is that the number of schools built in a district interacted with the year-of-birth cohort age-eligible at the time of construction generates intensity-of-treatment variation that is plausibly orthogonal to unobserved ability. Duflo's IV estimate of the return to schooling for Indonesian men was approximately 6.8–10.6 per cent, materially larger than the corresponding OLS estimate. The approach has since been applied in numerous developing-country settings, including Kenya (Ozier, 2018) and follow-up cohorts in Indonesia (Akresh et al.,2023).

2.4. Indian Evidence on Returns to Schooling

Indian returns-to-schooling estimates have typically been generated using OLS Mincerian regressions on successive rounds of the NSSO Employment-Unemployment Survey or the more recent PLFS. Duraisamy (2002), using NSSO 1983 and 1993–94 rounds, reported OLS returns of 5.9 per cent for men and 8.0 per cent for women. Dutta (2006), examining 1983 to 1999, documented a rising return over time and substantial gender heterogeneity. Agrawal (2012) extended the analysis to 2009–10 and reported OLS returns of about 7 per cent on average, with marked convexity above the secondary level. Azam (2010) documented the post-1991 rise in the skill premium for tertiary-educated workers. Few Indian studies, however, have employed credible IV strategies; Kingdon and Theopold (2008) used twin pairs but with a small sample, and Singh (2015) used family-background instruments that are unlikely to satisfy the exclusion restriction.

2.5. The District Primary Education Programme

The District Primary Education Programme was launched in 1994 with World Bank and DFID support as a flagship intervention to universalise primary education in educationally-backward districts (Jalan & Glinskaya, 2003; Pandey, Goyal, & Sundararaman, 2009). The programme provided district-level grants for school construction, teacher recruitment and training, learning materials, and capacity-building of district education offices. Phase I (1994) covered 42 districts; Phase II (1996) added 80 districts; subsequent phases extended coverage to 271 districts by 2002. Eligibility was determined by a composite backwardness criterion that included pre-programme female literacy below the national average. Although Sipahimalani-Rao and Clarke (2003) documented modest enrolment gains during the programme's implementation, no published study has used DPEP as an instrument for individual schooling in a wage equation. The present paper fills this gap.

2.6. Research Gap

Three gaps motivate the study. First, Indian returns-to-schooling estimates remain dominated by OLS approaches that may be substantially biased. Second, the staggered DPEP roll-out is a credible source of exogenous variation that has not been exploited in wage regressions. Third, modern instrument-validity diagnostics weak-instrument tests, over-identification tests, falsification on placebo cohorts have not been routinely applied in Indian work. The present paper addresses each of these gaps.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. The Human Capital Model

The Becker–Mincer human capital framework treats schooling as an investment that raises future earnings by augmenting productive capacity. In its standard form, the optimising individual chooses schooling years S to equate the marginal cost of schooling forgone earnings and direct costs to the marginal benefit, the discounted lifetime earnings increment. The first-order condition yields the empirical Mincer equation:

$$\ln W_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 S_i + \beta_2 EXP_i + \beta_3 EXP_i^2 + \gamma x_i + u_i \quad (1)$$

where W is the hourly wage, S is years of schooling, EXP is potential labour-market experience (typically defined as age minus S minus six), X is a vector of demographic and regional controls, and u is the error term. The parameter β1 is the focus of estimation.

3.2. Sources of OLS Bias

OLS estimation of β1 yields a consistent estimator only if S is uncorrelated with u. Two principal sources of correlation operate in opposite directions. Unobserved ability raises both S and W, generating Cov(S, u) > 0 and an upward bias. Classical measurement error in self-reported schooling, however, biases the OLS coefficient toward zero through attenuation. The net direction depends on the relative magnitudes of these forces. Empirically, the international evidence summarised in Card (1999, 2001) suggests that attenuation typically dominates for the marginal student, with IV estimates exceeding OLS by 20–40 per cent.

3.3. Identification through DPEP

Identification proceeds by constructing an instrument Z that is correlated with S but uncorrelated with u. Following Duflo (2001), the instrument interacts a district-level treatment indicator with cohort age-eligibility at the time of programme implementation:

$$z_{idc} = DPEP_d \times Exposure_c \quad (2)$$

where $DPEP_d$ is a binary indicator for whether district d entered DPEP Phase I or II, and $Exposure_c$ is the number of primary-school-age years (between ages 6 and 11) that cohort c spent in a treated district during the programme's active years. Identification requires that DPEP exposure affects wages only through its effect on schooling (the exclusion restriction). District fixed effects absorb time-invariant differences between treated and untreated districts; cohort fixed effects absorb India-wide secular trends in returns to schooling; and a treated-district × linear-trend term controls for differential pre-trends.

IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Data

The empirical analysis uses individual-level data from the 2018–19 and 2022–23 rounds of the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) conducted by the National Statistical Office. The PLFS provides nationally representative data on labour-force status, weekly wage earnings, hours worked, education, and demographic characteristics. The pooled sample includes wage-earners aged 23–37 years who were born between 1985 and 1995 and who were therefore of primary-school age during the DPEP roll-out (1994–2002). Self-employed workers are excluded because their earnings are not directly observed. District identifiers are matched to DPEP roll-out information drawn from Sipahimalani-Rao and Clarke (2003) and Pandey et al. (2009). The final analytical sample comprises approximately 96,000 individuals.

Table 1. Variable Definitions

Variable	Definition	Source
Log hourly wage	Natural log of real hourly wage (₹, 2011–12 prices, weekly earnings ÷ hours worked)	PLFS 2018–19, 2022–23
Years of schooling	Completed years of formal education (continuous)	PLFS
Experience	Age − schooling − 6 (potential labour-market experience)	Computed
DPEP exposure	Treated-district indicator × years of primary-school age (6–11) during DPEP	Constructed
Demographic	Gender, social group (SC/ST/OBC/General), religion, marital status	PLFS
Geographic	State fixed effects, urban indicator, district controls (pre-DPEP literacy)	PLFS; 1991 Census

Note. Wages deflated using state-specific CPI for industrial workers (Base: 2011–12). Author's compilation.

4.2. Empirical Specification

The second-stage Mincer equation is:

$$\mathrm{In}W_{i\,dc} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \hat{S}_{idc} + \beta_2 EXP_{idc} + \beta_3 EXP_{idc}^2 + \gamma X_{idc} + \delta_d + \lambda_c + \varepsilon_{idc} \quad (3)$$

where $\hat{S}$ is the predicted value of schooling from the first stage, δ_d denotes district fixed effects, and λ_c denotes birth-cohort fixed effects. The first-stage equation is:

$$S_{i\,dC} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 (DPEP_d \times Exposure_c) + \pi_2 EXP_{idc} + \pi_3 EXP_{idc}^2 + \theta X_{idc} + \delta_d + \lambda_c + \nu_{idc} \quad (4)$$

The 2SLS estimator is obtained by replacing S in the wage equation with the first-stage fitted value. Standard errors are clustered at the district level to allow for arbitrary within-district correlation in unobservables (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004).

4.3. Identification Tests

The credibility of the IV estimate rests on three identifying assumptions. First, the instrument must be relevant: DPEP exposure must materially affect schooling. This is assessed by the first-stage F-statistic on the excluded instrument, compared with the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak-instrument critical values. Second, the instrument must satisfy the exclusion restriction: DPEP exposure should affect wages only through its effect on schooling. While untestable in a single-instrument design, this is probed by including pre-DPEP district characteristics and by testing on a placebo cohort (1976–1984, too old to be exposed). Third, in the over-identified specification using a second instrument constructed from the timing of DPEP-II expansion, the Hansen J-statistic tests the joint validity of the instrument set.

4.4. Ethical Considerations

The PLFS unit-level data are publicly available, anonymised secondary records released by the National Statistical Office. No primary human-subjects research is involved. All sources are duly cited.

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 reports summary statistics for the pooled PLFS sample. Mean completed schooling is 9.7 years, with a standard deviation of 4.2 years; women report 9.1 years on average, men 10.1 years. The mean real hourly wage is ₹78.4 (2011–12 prices), with a substantial gender gap. Approximately 41 per cent of the sample is drawn from districts that were covered by DPEP Phase I or II. Within the treated districts, mean DPEP primary-school exposure for the sample cohorts is 3.6 years out of a possible 6.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, PLFS Pooled Sample

Variable	All	Men	Women
Log hourly wage	4.36	4.42	4.18
Real hourly wage (₹)	78.4	83.2	65.4
Years of schooling	9.7	10.1	9.1
Potential experience (years)	13.5	13.2	13.9
Age (years)	29.2	29.3	29.0
DPEP district (% sample)	40.8	40.5	41.3
Mean DPEP exposure (years, treated)	3.6	3.6	3.6
Observations	96,148	62,840	33,308

Note. Pooled PLFS 2018–19 and 2022–23 sample, urban wage earners aged 23–37 years. Author's calculations.

5.2. First-Stage Estimates and Instrument Strength

The first-stage relationship between DPEP exposure and years of schooling is strong and statistically robust. The coefficient on the DPEP × Exposure interaction is 0.187 (cluster-robust SE 0.035, $p < 0.01$), implying that an additional year of primary-school-age exposure in a DPEP district raises completed schooling by approximately 0.19 years. The first-stage F-statistic on the excluded instrument is 28.4, comfortably exceeding the Stock–Yogo (2005) 10 per cent critical value of 16.38 for a single endogenous regressor. The instrument is therefore strong by conventional criteria, and the IV point estimates can be interpreted with confidence.

5.3. OLS vs IV Estimates

Table 3 reports the headline OLS and 2SLS estimates of the return to schooling. Column (1) reports the OLS Mincerian return of 7.1 per cent per year of schooling, broadly consistent with the existing Indian literature (Agrawal, 2012; Duraisamy, 2002). The 2SLS estimate in column (2), instrumenting schooling with the DPEP × Exposure interaction, is 9.6 per cent per year, statistically significantly higher than the OLS estimate (Hausman test $\chi^2 = 6.18$, $p = 0.013$). The relative magnitude IV exceeding OLS by approximately 35 per cent is consistent with the international evidence summarised by Card (1999, 2001) and with the interpretation that attenuation bias dominates ability bias for the marginal student affected by the instrument.

Table 3. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Return to Schooling

	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS Men	(4) 2SLS Women
Years of schooling	0.071***	0.096***	0.083***	0.124***
	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.029)
Experience	0.038***	0.041***	0.044***	0.032***
Experience²	−0.0006***	−0.0007***	−0.0008***	−0.0005***
First-stage F	—	28.4	23.7	19.5
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	96,148	96,148	62,840	33,308

Note. Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Cluster-robust standard errors (district level) in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. All specifications include demographic controls and state fixed effects. Source: Author's estimation.

5.4. Heterogeneous Returns by Gender and Social Group

Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 report 2SLS estimates separately for men and women. The return to schooling for women, at 12.4 per cent, is roughly 50 per cent higher than that for men, at 8.3 per cent. The pattern is consistent with H_3 and with the cross-country evidence reviewed by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018) that women's returns to schooling tend to exceed men's, in part because the marginal female student would otherwise have lower bargaining power and labour-force attachment. Disaggregating by social group (results not tabulated for brevity) yields returns of 11.8 per cent for scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe workers and 8.7 per cent for general-category workers, suggesting that the DPEP-induced expansion of schooling generated particularly large gains for historically disadvantaged groups.

5.5. Convexity in Returns to Schooling

Replacing the linear schooling variable with educational-level dummies and instrumenting each with the corresponding DPEP exposure interactions reveals substantial convexity. The IV-estimated wage premium for completing secondary

schooling (10 years) relative to primary completion (5 years) is approximately 38 per cent, while the premium for completing higher secondary (12 years) over secondary is 42 per cent, and the premium for tertiary education over higher secondary is 71 per cent. These magnitudes are consistent with H_4 and with the post-1991 skill-premium evidence of Azam (2010).

5.6. Robustness and Falsification

Several robustness exercises support the validity of the main estimates. First, a placebo IV using cohorts born between 1976 and 1984 too old to have been exposed to DPEP at primary-school age yields a statistically insignificant first-stage coefficient (0.018, $p = 0.62$) and an insignificant reduced-form effect on wages, supporting the exclusion restriction. Second, restricting the sample to non-migrants (those still residing in their birth state) produces 2SLS estimates within 7 per cent of the baseline, alleviating concerns about endogenous migration. Third, controlling explicitly for pre-DPEP district characteristics (1991 literacy, urbanisation, infrastructure index) leaves the coefficient on schooling essentially unchanged. Fourth, in an over-identified specification that adds the timing of DPEP-II as a second instrument, the Hansen J-statistic of 0.65 ($p = 0.42$) fails to reject the joint validity of the instruments.

5.7. Discussion

Three points of discussion merit emphasis. First, the magnitude of the IV estimate 9.6 per cent per year is at the upper end of the existing Indian literature and, when combined with the marked convexity by educational level, implies that the conventional descriptive narrative of "modest returns to schooling in India" may have substantially understated the causal benefit. Second, the higher returns for women and for scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe workers underscore the equity case for continued investment in basic and secondary education, particularly in DPEP-style targeting of educationally backward districts. Third, the IV estimate captures a local average treatment effect for compliers students who completed additional schooling because of DPEP-induced supply expansion and may not generalise to populations facing different schooling-decision margins, such as urban middle-class students whose decisions are largely unaffected by primary-school construction.

Two limitations deserve mention. First, although the instrument satisfies standard validity tests, residual concerns about programme placement remain because DPEP districts were chosen partly on the basis of low female literacy. The district fixed effects absorb time-invariant differences, but differential trends could in principle remain. Second, the sample is restricted to wage-earners, excluding the substantial fraction of Indian workers in self-employment and casual labour for whom hourly wages are not directly observed; Heckman-style selection correction could be applied as an extension in future work.

VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study has presented quasi-experimental estimates of the private return to schooling in India using the staggered roll-out of the District Primary Education Programme as a source of exogenous variation. Following the identification strategy of Duflo (2001), the 2SLS estimator exploits the interaction between district-level DPEP treatment and cohort-level primary-school-age exposure. Four findings stand out. First, the IV estimate of the return to schooling is 9.6 per cent per year, significantly higher than the corresponding OLS estimate of 7.1 per cent. Second, the return is substantially higher for women (12.4 per cent) than for men (8.3 per cent) and higher for scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe workers than for general-category workers. Third, returns are convex in educational level, with the largest premia at the tertiary level. Fourth, the instrument passes weak-instrument, over-identification, and placebo tests.

Four policy implications follow. First, continued public investment in basic and secondary education is well justified by the magnitude of estimated returns, particularly for girls and historically disadvantaged groups. Second, the supply-side approach embodied in DPEP infrastructure, teacher recruitment, and district capacity-building delivers measurable labour-market gains a generation later, supporting the case for sustained funding of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and the Samagra Shiksha programme. Third, the marked convexity in returns argues for closing not only the primary but also the secondary and tertiary-attainment gaps, including through scholarship programmes and conditional cash transfers. Fourth, the higher returns for women warrant gender-targeted interventions to relax remaining constraints safe transport, hostels, vocational pathways that limit the translation of schooling into wages.

Three avenues for future research are particularly promising. First, the analysis could be extended to study downstream outcomes occupational sorting, marriage and fertility, child outcomes on which schooling may have effects beyond the wage. Second, structural models of schooling choice that integrate the demand and supply sides would help interpret the LATE estimated here against alternative policy counterfactuals. Third, the interaction between DPEP and subsequent reforms Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, the Mid-Day Meal Scheme, and the Right to Education Act is a natural extension as longer panels become available.

REFERENCES

Agrawal, T. (2012). Returns to education in India: Some recent evidence. *Journal of Quantitative Economics, 10*(2), 131–151.

Akresh, R., Halim, D., & Kleemans, M. (2023). Long-term and intergenerational effects of education: Evidence from school construction in Indonesia. *The Economic Journal, 133*(650), 582–612. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac058

Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (1991). Does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106*(4), 979–1014. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937954

Ashenfelter, O., & Krueger, A. (1994). Estimates of the economic return to schooling from a new sample of twins. *American Economic Review, 84*(5), 1157–1173.

Azam, M. (2010). India's increasing skill premium: Role of demand and supply. *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10*(1), Article 82. https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.2279

Becker, G. S. (1964). *Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education*. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119*(1), 249–275. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839588

Card, D. (1999). The causal effect of education on earnings. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), *Handbook of labor economics* (Vol. 3A, pp. 1801–1863). Elsevier.

Card, D. (2001). Estimating the return to schooling: Progress on some persistent econometric problems. *Econometrica, 69*(5), 1127–1160. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00237

Duflo, E. (2001). Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment. *American Economic Review, 91*(4), 795–813. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.4.795

Duflo, E. (2004). The medium run effects of educational expansion: Evidence from a large school construction program in Indonesia. *Journal of Development Economics, 74*(1), 163–197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.12.008

Duraisamy, P. (2002). Changes in returns to education in India, 1983–94: By gender, age-cohort and location. *Economics of Education Review, 21*(6), 609–622. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0272-7757(01)00047-4

Dutta, P. V. (2006). Returns to education: New evidence for India, 1983–1999. *Education Economics, 14*(4), 431–451. https://doi.org/10.1080/09645290600854128

Government of India. (2023). *Economic survey 2022–23*. Ministry of Finance.

Griliches, Z. (1977). Estimating the returns to schooling: Some econometric problems. *Econometrica, 45*(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913285

Imbens, G. W., & Angrist, J. D. (1994). Identification and estimation of local average treatment effects. *Econometrica, 62*(2), 467–475. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951620

Jalan, J., & Glinskaya, E. (2003). *Improving primary school education in India: An impact assessment of DPEP-I* (Working Paper). World Bank.

Kingdon, G. G. (1998). Does the labour market explain lower female schooling in India? *The Journal of Development Studies, 35*(1), 39–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220389808422554

Kingdon, G., & Theopold, N. (2008). Do returns to education matter to schooling participation? Evidence from India. *Education Economics, 16*(4), 329–350. https://doi.org/10.1080/09645290802312453

Mincer, J. (1974). *Schooling, experience, and earnings*. National Bureau of Economic Research.

National Statistical Office. (2020). *Periodic Labour Force Survey 2018–19: Annual report*. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India.

National Statistical Office. (2023). *Periodic Labour Force Survey 2022–23: Annual report*. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India.

Oreopoulos, P. (2006). Estimating average and local average treatment effects of education when compulsory schooling laws really matter. *American Economic Review, 96*(1), 152–175. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806776157641

Ozier, O. (2018). The impact of secondary schooling in Kenya: A regression discontinuity analysis. *Journal of Human Resources, 53*(1), 157–188. https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.53.1.0915-7407R

Pandey, P., Goyal, S., & Sundararaman, V. (2009). *Community participation in public schools: Impact of information campaigns in three Indian states* (Policy Research Working Paper No. 4776). World Bank.

Psacharopoulos, G., & Patrinos, H. A. (2018). Returns to investment in education: A decennial review of the global literature. *Education Economics, 26*(5), 445–458. https://doi.org/10.1080/09645292.2018.1484426

Singh, A. (2015). Private school effects in urban and rural India: Panel estimates at primary and secondary school ages. *Journal of Development Economics, 113*, 16–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.10.004

Sipahimalani-Rao, V., & Clarke, P. (2003). *A review of educational progress and reform in the District Primary Education Programme*. World Bank.

Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. In D. W. K. Andrews & J. H. Stock (Eds.), *Identification and inference for econometric models: Essays in honor of Thomas Rothenberg* (pp. 80–108). Cambridge University Press.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC INSIGHTS AND RESEARCH (JEIR)
(Open Access, Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Journal)
ISSN Online: 3107-9482 ISSN Print: 3139-1982

Remittances and Economic Growth in Kerala, India: An Empirical Analysis Using the ARDL Bounds Testing Approach (2000–2023)

Anna Maria Sunny

Research Scholar, PG Department of Economics, Panampilly Memorial Govt. College, Chalakudy, Kerala, India

Article information

Received: 7th February 2026
Received in revised form: 10th March 2026
Accepted: 14th April 2026
Available online: 25th May 2026

Volume: 2
Issue: 2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.63090/JEIR/3107.9482.0019

Abstract

Kerala receives one of the highest per-capita inflows of international remittances in India, with the Kerala Migration Survey 2018 estimating remittance receipts of approximately ₹85,092 crore, equivalent to 19.1 per cent of the state's Net State Domestic Product (Zachariah & Rajan, 2019). Whether such flows translate into sustained economic growth, however, remains contested in the development economics literature. This study examines the long-run and short-run relationship between international remittances and economic growth in Kerala using annual time-series data from 2000 to 2023. Drawing on the new economics of labour migration (Stark & Bloom, 1985) and endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986), the paper specifies a multivariate model linking per-capita real gross state domestic product (GSDP) to remittance inflows, gross fixed capital formation, human capital, financial development, and trade openness. The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing procedure proposed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) is employed to test for cointegration, complemented by the Toda–Yamamoto causality test. Findings indicate a statistically significant positive long-run elasticity of GSDP with respect to remittances of approximately 0.18, conditional on financial development. Short-run dynamics are weaker, and the error-correction term confirms convergence to long-run equilibrium at a moderate speed. The results support a complementarity hypothesis: remittances foster growth when intermediated through a developed financial sector, consistent with Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009). Policy implications include strengthening formal remittance channels, deepening rural banking penetration, and channelling diaspora savings into productive investment vehicles.

Keywords: - Remittances, Economic Growth, Kerala, ARDL Bounds Testing, Migration, Financial Development.

I. INTRODUCTION

International labour migration has become a defining feature of the South Asian development experience over the past four decades. According to the World Bank (2023), remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries reached approximately USD 669 billion in 2023, surpassing both official development assistance and foreign direct investment in many recipient economies. India is the world's largest remittance recipient, receiving an estimated USD 125 billion in 2023 (World Bank, 2023), of which Kerala accounts for a disproportionately large share.

The Kerala economy presents a paradigmatic case for studying the macroeconomic effects of remittances. Despite limited natural resources and an industrial base weaker than that of comparable Indian states, Kerala has achieved human development outcomes life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality comparable to upper-middle-income countries (Drèze & Sen, 2013). A central explanation for this "Kerala model" is the sustained inflow of remittances from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries since the 1970s oil boom (Zachariah et al., 2003). The Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) series, conducted by the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) since 1998, has documented that approximately 2.1 million Keralites were working abroad in 2018, remitting ₹85,092 crore in that year alone (Rajan & Zachariah, 2019).

Theoretically, the macroeconomic effects of remittances are ambiguous. On the one hand, remittances may augment savings, ease credit constraints, finance human capital formation, and stimulate aggregate demand, thereby raising output (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Mundaca, 2009). On the other hand, they may generate Dutch-disease-type real exchange rate

appreciation, weaken labour-force participation through reservation-wage effects, and reduce institutional accountability when they substitute for fiscal revenue (Acosta et al., 2009; Chami et al., 2003) . The empirical evidence is similarly mixed, and the net effect appears to be conditional on the recipient economy's absorptive capacity, particularly the depth of its financial system (Catrinescu et al., 2009).

1.1. Research Problem

Although a sizeable literature has examined remittance growth linkages at the cross-country level, sub-national analyses for India remain comparatively scarce. Existing Kerala-specific studies are largely descriptive (Zachariah & Rajan, 2012; Prakash, 1998), or rely on household surveys that, while informative about consumption and poverty effects, do not address aggregate growth dynamics. There is therefore a need for a rigorous time-series investigation that:

- Tests for a stable long-run relationship between remittances and aggregate output in Kerala
- Identifies the direction of causality, and
- Accounts for the moderating role of financial development.

1.2. Research Objectives

This study pursues three objectives:

- To examine the long-run cointegrating relationship between remittance inflows and per-capita real GSDP in Kerala over 2000–2023.
- To assess the short-run dynamics and the speed of adjustment toward long-run equilibrium.
- To investigate whether financial development conditions the remittance growth nexus, thereby testing the complementarity hypothesis advanced by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009).

1.3. Research Hypotheses

Building on the theoretical and empirical literature, the following hypotheses are tested:

- H1: Remittances exert a statistically significant positive effect on per-capita real GSDP in the long run.
- H2: The remittance growth relationship is conditional on the level of financial development, such that the marginal effect of remittances rises with credit-deposit ratio.
- H3: There exists unidirectional causality running from remittances to economic growth, rather than the reverse.

1.4. Significance and Organisation

The study contributes to the development economics literature in three ways. First, it provides a sub-national time-series test of the remittance growth hypothesis using India's most remittance-dependent state. Second, it explicitly incorporates a remittance finance interaction term, addressing the conditional-effects problem highlighted by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007). Third, the findings carry direct policy relevance for state governments in remittance-dependent economies. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 sets out the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the data and econometric methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes with policy implications and avenues for future research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Cross-Country Evidence

The earliest formal treatment of remittances within a macroeconomic framework was provided by Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003), who argued using an IMF panel of 113 countries that remittances behave as compensatory transfers rather than as investment capital, and that their effect on growth is negative once moral-hazard problems within recipient households are accounted for. This pessimistic conclusion was challenged by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), whose panel of 100 developing countries demonstrated that the marginal growth effect of remittances is positive in economies with shallow financial systems, where remittances act as a substitute for inaccessible bank credit. The two studies together established a conditional-effects research programme that continues to dominate the field.

Subsequent contributions have refined this picture. Catrinescu et al. (2009) showed that institutional quality is at least as important as financial development in conditioning the remittance growth nexus. Mundaca (2009), examining Central American and Caribbean economies, confirmed that financial intermediation amplifies the growth effects of remittances. Barajas, Chami, Fullenkamp, Gapen, and Montiel (2009), however, in an influential IMF working paper, found that across a large panel of countries remittances do not robustly promote economic growth and may even slow it through real exchange rate channels. Adams and Page (2005), focusing on poverty rather than growth, established that a 10 per cent rise in per-capita international remittances is associated with a 3.5 per cent decline in the headcount poverty ratio, a result corroborated for Latin America by Acosta, Calderón, Fajnzylber, and López (2008).

2.2. South Asian and Indian Studies

Country-level studies of remittances in South Asia are relatively recent. Pradhan, Upadhyay, and Upadhyaya (2008) reported a positive growth effect of remittances for a panel of 39 developing countries that included India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Jongwanich (2007), in an Asian Development Bank working paper covering Asia-Pacific developing economies, found that remittances reduce poverty and inequality but exhibit only a small, statistically marginal effect on aggregate growth. For India specifically, Singh (2006) used a cointegration approach and identified a positive long-run association between

remittances and output, while Rao and Hassan (2011), in a generalised method of moments (GMM) framework, found that remittances exert positive but small direct effects on growth and additional indirect effects through investment and financial development.

2.3. Kerala-Specific Literature

The Kerala diaspora has been the focus of a sustained programme of household research conducted at the Centre for Development Studies since 1998. The successive Kerala Migration Surveys (KMS) by Zachariah, Mathew, and Rajan (2001, 2003) and Rajan and Zachariah (2019) provide the empirical bedrock for the field. Their work documents the demographic profile of emigrants, the volume and use of remittances, and the socio-economic transformation of migrant households. Prakash (1998) analysed the structural implications of Gulf migration and warned of a "rentier" consumption pattern, while Kannan and Hari (2002) argued that remittance-financed consumption was the principal driver of Kerala's post-1990 growth acceleration.

More recent contributions have extended the analysis. Pushpangadan (2003) modelled remittance-led growth using a structural macroeconomic framework. Joseph and Narendran (2013) examined the impact of remittances on consumption inequality. However, formal time-series tests of the remittance growth relationship at the sub-national level remain rare, and to the author's knowledge no published study has yet applied the ARDL bounds procedure together with a financial-development interaction in the Kerala context. This study seeks to fill that gap.

2.4. Research Gap

The literature reviewed reveals three gaps. First, although Kerala is empirically central to discussions of the Indian diaspora, rigorous econometric tests of remittance growth dynamics at the state level are underdeveloped. Second, where state-level work exists, it has rarely tested for cointegration or specified an interaction with financial development. Third, the post-2010 period encompassing the global financial crisis, oil-price shocks affecting GCC labour markets, and the COVID-19 pandemic remains under-studied. The present paper addresses all three gaps.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. The New Economics of Labour Migration

The conceptual foundation for this study is the new economics of labour migration (NELM), originally formulated by Stark and Bloom (1985) and elaborated by Lucas and Stark (1985). NELM departs from the neoclassical individual-utility-maximisation tradition of Todaro (1969) by treating the migration decision as a household-level risk-diversification strategy. Under NELM, migration is undertaken jointly by sending households and the migrant in order to overcome capital and insurance-market failures in the origin economy. Remittances are therefore endogenous to a household contract and may be motivated by altruism, exchange, insurance, or inheritance considerations (Lucas & Stark, 1985).

3.2. Endogenous Growth Mechanisms

To translate the NELM micro-foundation into macro-level testable hypotheses, this study embeds remittances within a Romer (1986) type endogenous growth framework. Aggregate output Y is taken as a function of physical capital K, human capital H, and a productivity term A:

$$Y = A \cdot F(K, H, L) \tag{1}$$

Remittances (REM) enter through three channels. First, by relaxing household credit constraints, they raise the savings rate and hence the steady-state capital stock (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). Second, they finance investment in education and health, augmenting human capital (Acosta et al., 2008). Third, through demand-side multiplier effects they raise capacity utilisation in the short run. Against these positive channels stand the Dutch-disease mechanism (Acosta et al., 2009) and the moral-hazard mechanism (Chami et al., 2003), which may reduce labour supply and weaken productivity. The net effect is an empirical question. The interaction with financial development (FD) is central: when banks intermediate remittances efficiently, the proportion channelled to productive investment rises, and the long-run elasticity of output with respect to remittances increases.

3.3. Conceptual Model

The hypothesised relationships can be summarised as follows. Remittances raise growth directly through capital accumulation and human-capital investment, and indirectly by relaxing household and firm financing constraints. The strength of these channels depends on:

- The depth of the financial system
- Trade openness, and
- The quality of complementary public investment.

A higher credit-deposit ratio is therefore expected to amplify the long-run remittance elasticity. This framework motivates the empirical specification developed in Section 4.

IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Research Design and Approach

The study adopts a quantitative, deductive research design (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The choice is consistent with the macroeconomic, hypothesis-testing nature of the research questions. The temporal unit is the financial year (April–March), and the geographic unit is the State of Kerala.

4.2. Data and Variables

Annual data from 2000–01 to 2022–23 (24 observations) are compiled from multiple official sources. Per-capita real GSDP is sourced from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Kerala, and the Central Statistics Office (CSO), rebased to 2011–12 prices. Remittance inflows are obtained from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) state-wise remittance estimates, supplemented by Kerala Migration Survey data for benchmark years (Zachariah & Rajan, 2019). Financial development is proxied by the credit-deposit ratio of scheduled commercial banks operating in Kerala (RBI, various years). Gross fixed capital formation and trade openness are taken from CSO and the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics. Human capital is proxied by gross enrolment ratio in higher secondary and tertiary education (Government of Kerala, Economic Review, various issues). All monetary variables are converted to constant prices and expressed in natural logarithms.

Table 1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources

Variable	Definition	Notation	Source
GSDP	Per-capita real Gross State Domestic Product (₹, 2011–12 prices)	lnY	CSO; Government of Kerala
Remittances	Real remittance inflows to Kerala (₹ crore)	lnREM	RBI; KMS (CDS)
Capital formation	Gross fixed capital formation (% of GSDP)	lnGFCF	CSO
Human capital	Gross enrolment ratio, higher and tertiary education	lnHC	Economic Review, Kerala
Financial dev.	Credit-deposit ratio of scheduled commercial banks (Kerala)	lnFD	RBI Banking Statistics
Trade openness	(Exports + Imports) / GSDP	lnOPEN	DGCIS; CSO

Note. All variables are in natural logarithms. Author's compilation.

4.3. Model Specification

Following Pesaran et al. (2001), the baseline ARDL(p, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5) error-correction representation is:

$$EM_{t-i} + \sum\delta_i\, \Delta InGFCF_{t-i} + \sum\theta_i \Delta In\, \Delta InHC_{t-i} + \sum\phi_i\, \Delta InFD_{t-i} + \sum\psi_i \Delta InOPEN_{t-i} + \lambda_1 InY_{t-1} + \lambda_2\, InREM_{t-1} + \lambda_3\, InGFCF_{t-1} + \lambda_4\, InHC_{t-1} + \lambda_5\, InFD_{t-1} + \lambda_6\, InOPEN_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

To test the conditional-effects hypothesis (H_2), an augmented specification adds the interaction term (lnREM × lnFD). A statistically significant positive coefficient on this term, jointly with a significant coefficient on lnREM, would support the Giuliano–Ruiz-Arranz hypothesis that financial depth amplifies the growth contribution of remittances.

4.4. Estimation Procedure

The empirical strategy follows the standard sequence advocated in time-series econometrics. First, unit-root properties of each series are examined using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) and the Phillips–Perron (1988) tests. Because the ARDL bounds procedure can accommodate variables that are I(0), I(1), or a mixture of both but not I(2) the order of integration is verified before estimation. Second, the optimal lag structure is selected using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Third, cointegration is tested using the F-statistic for the joint significance of the lagged level coefficients (λ1 … λ6), compared with the upper and lower critical bounds tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2001). Fourth, if cointegration is established, long-run coefficients and the error-correction term (ECT) are estimated. Fifth, diagnostic tests for serial correlation (Breusch–Godfrey), heteroskedasticity (Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey), normality (Jarque–Bera), and parameter stability (CUSUM and CUSUMSQ) are conducted. Finally, the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure is used to determine the direction of causality, an approach that is robust to the integration order of the underlying series.

4.5. Ethical Considerations

The study uses only publicly available, aggregated secondary data. No human-subjects research is involved. All sources are duly cited.

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables in log form. Per-capita real GSDP grew from approximately ₹39,500 in 2000–01 to ₹172,000 in 2022–23, an annualised compound growth rate of about 6.5 per cent. Remittance inflows rose from

roughly ₹14,000 crore to over ₹85,000 crore in nominal terms over the same period. The credit-deposit ratio improved from 0.43 to 0.66, indicating substantial deepening of bank intermediation. All series exhibit broadly stationary properties in first differences (skewness near zero; kurtosis close to three), suggesting that subsequent inferential tests are unlikely to be distorted by gross non-normality.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (Logged Variables, 2000–2023)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
lnY	11.31	0.49	10.58	12.06
lnREM	10.78	0.62	9.55	11.36
lnGFCF	3.27	0.18	2.96	3.55
lnHC	3.41	0.22	3.05	3.78
lnFD	−0.55	0.15	−0.84	−0.36
lnOPEN	3.04	0.27	2.60	3.42

Note. N = 24. Author's calculations using RBI, CSO, and Government of Kerala data.

5.2. Unit-Root Test Results

The Augmented Dickey–Fuller and Phillips–Perron tests indicate that lnY, lnREM, lnFD, and lnOPEN are integrated of order one, I(1), while lnGFCF and lnHC are stationary at levels, I(0). Because the variables exhibit a mixed order of integration but none are I(2), the ARDL bounds testing procedure is the appropriate framework (Pesaran et al., 2001).

5.3. Cointegration Results

Lag selection based on the Akaike Information Criterion yielded an ARDL(1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) specification. The calculated F-statistic of 5.42 exceeds the 1 per cent upper bound critical value of 4.68 reported in Pesaran et al. (2001, Table CI(iii)), allowing rejection of the null of no cointegration. A stable long-run relationship between lnY and its regressors is therefore confirmed.

5.4. Long-Run and Short-Run Estimates

Table 3 reports the estimated long-run coefficients. Remittances exert a statistically significant positive long-run effect on per-capita real GSDP, with an elasticity of 0.184 ($p < 0.01$). A 10 per cent rise in real remittances is associated, in the long run, with an approximately 1.84 per cent rise in per-capita output, ceteris paribus. The coefficient on the interaction term lnREM × lnFD is positive and significant at the 5 per cent level, supporting the complementarity hypothesis: financial deepening amplifies the marginal growth contribution of remittances. Gross fixed capital formation and human capital both enter with the expected positive signs, while trade openness is significant only at the 10 per cent level.

Table 3. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent Variable: lnY)

Regressor	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-stat	p-value
lnREM	0.184***	0.052	3.54	0.003
lnGFCF	0.412***	0.114	3.61	0.002
lnHC	0.286**	0.121	2.36	0.031
lnFD	0.155**	0.069	2.25	0.038
lnREM × lnFD	0.094**	0.041	2.29	0.035
lnOPEN	0.071*	0.039	1.82	0.087
Constant	4.215***	1.043	4.04	0.001

Note. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Author's estimation.

The short-run error-correction equation yields an ECT coefficient of −0.482 ($p < 0.01$), indicating that approximately 48 per cent of any deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected within one year. The implied half-life of adjustment is approximately 1.05 years, consistent with a moderately rapid convergence process. Short-run elasticities for remittances and capital formation retain their expected positive signs but are smaller in magnitude than the long-run estimates, suggesting that the growth effects of remittances accrue mainly through accumulation channels rather than impact-period demand effects.

5.5. Diagnostic and Stability Tests

Diagnostic tests support the validity of the estimated model. The Breusch–Godfrey LM test produces a p-value of 0.42, indicating no serial correlation. The Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test ($p = 0.51$) shows homoskedastic residuals. The Jarque–Bera statistic ($p = 0.63$) is consistent with normally distributed residuals. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots remain within the 5 per cent critical bounds throughout the sample, indicating parameter stability.

5.6. Causality Analysis

The Toda–Yamamoto causality test, conducted with the appropriate lag augmentation, indicates unidirectional Granger causality running from remittances to per-capita GSDP at the 5 per cent significance level, while the reverse hypothesis cannot be rejected. The result is consistent with H_3 and with the broader cross-country evidence reported by Mundaca (2009) and Catrinescu et al. (2009).

5.7. Discussion

The findings advance the Kerala-specific literature in several respects. The long-run elasticity of 0.18 is notably larger than the median 0.05–0.10 reported in cross-country panels (Catrinescu et al., 2009; Pradhan et al., 2008), reflecting Kerala's exceptional dependence on remittance inflows at roughly one-fifth of state output and the comparatively high marginal propensity to save and invest within migrant households documented by Rajan and Zachariah (2019). The significance of the interaction term reinforces the policy importance of financial intermediation: without efficient channels to convert remittance receipts into productive investment, a substantial part of the growth dividend would be lost. This pattern is consistent with the conditional-effects framework of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) and contradicts the unconditional pessimism of Chami et al. (2003).

The unidirectional causality result is theoretically meaningful. It suggests that remittances are an exogenous source of growth for Kerala rather than a passive reaction to domestic income shortfalls. Two caveats deserve mention. First, the relatively short sample (24 annual observations) limits the power of small-sample tests, although Pesaran et al. (2001) demonstrated that the ARDL approach performs adequately in such cases. Second, the analysis does not separately identify Dutch-disease effects through the real exchange rate, which deserve attention in future work using disaggregated tradable–non-tradable sectoral data along the lines of Acosta et al. (2009).

VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study has examined the macroeconomic effects of international remittances on the Kerala economy over 2000–2023, applying the ARDL bounds testing procedure to annual time-series data and testing the conditional-effects hypothesis through a remittance finance interaction. Three findings stand out. First, remittances exert a statistically significant positive long-run effect on per-capita real GSDP, with an elasticity of approximately 0.18. Second, this effect is conditional on the depth of the formal financial sector: financial development amplifies the growth contribution of remittances, supporting the conditional-effects framework of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009). Third, causality runs from remittances to growth rather than the reverse, indicating that remittances function as an exogenous source of capital accumulation.

Three policy implications follow. First, the Government of Kerala should continue to strengthen formal remittance channels and reduce transaction costs, in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 10.c. Second, deepening financial inclusion particularly the credit-deposit ratio of rural and semi-urban branches would amplify the growth dividend from remittance inflows. Third, the design of diaspora-targeted investment instruments, including state development bonds and equity vehicles, could redirect remittance receipts away from purely consumption-augmenting uses toward productive investment in infrastructure and human capital.

Three avenues for future research deserve mention. First, disaggregated sectoral analysis would help isolate Dutch-disease mechanisms. Second, household-level panel data linking remittance receipts to investment and labour-supply decisions would complement the macro-level findings reported here. Third, the post-pandemic restructuring of Gulf labour markets and the implications for remittance flows warrant continued empirical monitoring.

REFERENCES

Acosta, P., Calderón, C., Fajnzylber, P., & López, H. (2008). What is the impact of international remittances on poverty and inequality in Latin America? *World Development, 36*(1), 89–114. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.02.016

Acosta, P. A., Lartey, E. K. K., & Mandelman, F. S. (2009). Remittances and the Dutch disease. *Journal of International Economics, 79*(1), 102–116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.06.007

Adams, R. H., & Page, J. (2005). Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries? *World Development, 33*(10), 1645–1669. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.05.004

Barajas, A., Chami, R., Fullenkamp, C., Gapen, M., & Montiel, P. (2009). *Do workers' remittances promote economic growth?* (IMF Working Paper No. WP/09/153). International Monetary Fund.

Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2007). Finance, inequality and the poor. *Journal of Economic Growth, 12*(1), 27–49. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-007-9010-6

Catrinescu, N., Leon-Ledesma, M., Piracha, M., & Quillin, B. (2009). Remittances, institutions, and economic growth. *World Development, 37*(1), 81–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.02.004

Chami, R., Fullenkamp, C., & Jahjah, S. (2003). *Are immigrant remittance flows a source of capital for development?* (IMF Working Paper No. WP/03/189). International Monetary Fund.

Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (5th ed.). SAGE Publications.

Dickey, D. A., & Fuller, W. A. (1979). Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series with a unit root. *Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74*(366), 427–431. https://doi.org/10.2307/2286348

Drèze, J., & Sen, A. (2013). *An uncertain glory: India and its contradictions.* Princeton University Press.

Engle, R. F., & Granger, C. W. J. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: Representation, estimation, and testing. *Econometrica, 55*(2), 251–276. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913236

Giuliano, P., & Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2009). Remittances, financial development, and growth. *Journal of Development Economics, 90*(1), 144–152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.10.005

Government of Kerala. (various issues). *Economic review.* Kerala State Planning Board.

Jongwanich, J. (2007). *Workers' remittances, economic growth and poverty in developing Asia and the Pacific countries* (UN-ESCAP Working Paper No. WP/07/01). United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

Joseph, K. J., & Narendran, V. (2013). *Neo-liberal reforms and the Kerala economy.* Centre for Development Studies.

Kannan, K. P., & Hari, K. S. (2002). *Kerala's Gulf connection: Remittances and their macroeconomic impact, 1972–2000* (CDS Working Paper No. 328). Centre for Development Studies.

Lucas, R. E. B., & Stark, O. (1985). Motivations to remit: Evidence from Botswana. *Journal of Political Economy, 93*(5), 901–918. https://doi.org/10.1086/261341

Mundaca, B. G. (2009). Remittances, financial market development, and economic growth: The case of Latin America and the Caribbean. *Review of Development Economics, 13*(2), 288–303. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00487.x

Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., & Smith, R. J. (2001). Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level relationships. *Journal of Applied Econometrics, 16*(3), 289–326. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.616

Phillips, P. C. B., & Perron, P. (1988). Testing for a unit root in time series regression. *Biometrika, 75*(2), 335–346. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/75.2.335

Pradhan, G., Upadhyay, M., & Upadhyaya, K. (2008). Remittances and economic growth in developing countries. *The European Journal of Development Research, 20*(3), 497–506. https://doi.org/10.1080/09578810802246285

Prakash, B. A. (1998). Gulf migration and its economic impact: The Kerala experience. *Economic and Political Weekly, 33*(50), 3209–3213.

Pushpangadan, K. (2003). *Remittances, consumption and economic growth in Kerala: 1980–2000* (CDS Working Paper No. 343). Centre for Development Studies.

Rajan, S. I., & Zachariah, K. C. (2019). *Emigration and remittances: New evidence from the Kerala Migration Survey 2018* (CDS Working Paper No. 483). Centre for Development Studies.

Rao, B. B., & Hassan, G. M. (2011). A panel data analysis of the growth effects of remittances. *Economic Modelling, 28*(1–2), 701–709. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2010.05.011

Reserve Bank of India. (various years). *Basic statistical returns of scheduled commercial banks in India*. RBI.

Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing returns and long-run growth. *Journal of Political Economy, 94*(5), 1002–1037. https://doi.org/10.1086/261420

Singh, R. J. (2006). *Macroeconomic determinants of remittances: Evidence from India* (Working Paper). International Monetary Fund.

Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70*(1), 65–94. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884513

Stark, O., & Bloom, D. E. (1985). The new economics of labor migration. *The American Economic Review, 75*(2), 173–178.

Toda, H. Y., & Yamamoto, T. (1995). Statistical inference in vector autoregressions with possibly integrated processes. *Journal of Econometrics, 66*(1–2), 225–250. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01616-8

Todaro, M. P. (1969). A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries. *The American Economic Review, 59*(1), 138–148.

World Bank. (2023). *Migration and development brief 39: Leveraging diaspora finances for private capital mobilization.* World Bank Group.

Zachariah, K. C., Mathew, E. T., & Rajan, S. I. (2001). Social, economic and demographic consequences of migration on Kerala. *International Migration, 39*(2), 43–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00149

Zachariah, K. C., Mathew, E. T., & Rajan, S. I. (2003). *Dynamics of migration in Kerala: Dimensions, differentials and consequences.* Orient Longman.

Zachariah, K. C., & Rajan, S. I. (2012). *Kerala's Gulf connection, 1998–2011: Economic and social impact of migration.* Orient Blackswan.

Zachariah, K. C., & Rajan, S. I. (2019). *Migration and remittances in Kerala: Findings from the Kerala Migration Survey 2018.* Centre for Development Studies.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC INSIGHTS AND RESEARCH (JEIR)
(Open Access, Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Journal)
ISSN Online: 3107-9482 ISSN Print: 3139-1982

The Causal Effect of Rural Road Connectivity on Household Welfare in India: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana

Anisha NG

Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, St. Joseph's College (Autonomous) Irinjalakuda, Kerala, India

Article information

Received: 9th February 2026
Received in revised form: 13th March 2026
Accepted: 16th April 2026
Available online: 25th May 2026

Volume: 2
Issue: 2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.63090/JEIR/3107.9482.0020

Abstract

Despite a long-standing presumption that rural road connectivity is essential for economic development, credible causal estimates of its household-level welfare effects remain scarce. This study exploits the population-threshold eligibility rule of the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY)—the Government of India's flagship rural road programme launched in 2000—to estimate the causal effect of new road connectivity on rural household welfare. Under the PMGSY guidelines, unconnected habitations were prioritised for road construction if their population met or exceeded a sharp threshold: 1,000 persons in plains areas and 500 persons in hill, tribal, and desert districts. The discontinuous change in road-receipt probability at these cutoffs supports a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design in the tradition of Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008). Using habitation-level census data matched to the PMGSY Online Management, Monitoring and Accounting System (OMMAS) database and to NSSO consumption rounds, this paper estimates local average treatment effects at the eligibility threshold using local-linear regression with the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth and robust bias-corrected confidence intervals. Findings indicate that PMGSY-induced road connectivity raised real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure by approximately 5.4 per cent, increased the share of working-age adults employed outside agriculture by 4.8 percentage points, and reduced the proportion of households below the rural poverty line by 3.7 percentage points. The McCrary density test fails to reject no manipulation of the running variable at the threshold, and pre-determined covariates are balanced across the cutoff, supporting the validity of the design. The results survive donut-RD, alternative kernels, and placebo cutoffs at non-threshold population values. The findings constitute robust evidence that rural transport infrastructure is a high-return investment for poverty reduction and structural transformation in agrarian economies.

Keywords: - Rural Roads, PMGSY, Regression Discontinuity, Cnsumption, Structural Transformation, India.

I. INTRODUCTION

Rural transport infrastructure has long been viewed as a precondition for economic transformation in agrarian societies. From the colonial-era railway expansion analysed by Donaldson (2018) to the post-independence Bharat Nirman programme of 2005, successive Indian governments have invested heavily in linking villages to wider markets. Yet the causal welfare effects of new road connectivity for the previously unconnected rural household have been difficult to pin down, primarily because road placement is endogenous: governments tend to build roads where they expect them to be productive, and where political incentives push them. Naïve cross-sectional comparisons of connected and unconnected villages therefore conflate the effect of the road with the effect of the underlying factors that determined its placement (Asher & Novosad, 2020).

The Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), launched in December 2000 with central financing from the Ministry of Rural Development, was designed to provide all-weather road connectivity to every unconnected habitation in

rural India. By 2022, approximately 1.83 lakh habitations had been connected, with cumulative expenditure exceeding ₹3 lakh crore (Ministry of Rural Development, 2023). The programme is among the largest rural-infrastructure interventions in history. Critically for the empirical economist, PMGSY guidelines specified a sharp population-based prioritisation rule: unconnected habitations with population at or above 1,000 persons in plains areas (or 500 persons in hill, tribal, and desert areas) were eligible for first-priority connection, while smaller habitations were deferred to subsequent phases. This threshold rule generates a discontinuity in road-receipt probability that, under standard identifying assumptions, supports a regression discontinuity (RD) design (Asher & Novosad, 2020).

1.1. Research Problem

Three considerations motivate the analysis. First, although a growing empirical literature on PMGSY has demonstrated effects on agriculture, non-farm employment, and education (Aggarwal, 2018; Asher & Novosad, 2020 Adukia et al., 2020), the household-welfare effects particularly on consumption expenditure and poverty have received comparatively less rigorous treatment outside the largest village-level studies. Second, much of the existing literature focuses on aggregate outcomes; heterogeneity by household landholding, social group, and gender of the household head remains under-examined. Third, with several additional rounds of PMGSY implementation since the earlier RD applications, an updated estimate using more recent data is warranted.

1.2. Research Objectives

The study pursues four objectives:

- To estimate the causal effect of PMGSY-induced road connectivity on real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure of rural households in newly connected habitations.
- To examine the effect on the structural composition of employment, specifically the share of working-age adults employed outside agriculture.
- To assess the impact on rural poverty measured by the Tendulkar headcount ratio.
- To investigate heterogeneity in treatment effects by landholding class, social group, and household head's gender.

1.3. Research Hypotheses

Four hypotheses are tested:

- H1: PMGSY-induced road connectivity raises real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure of treated households relative to untreated households just below the eligibility threshold.
- H2: Road connectivity shifts the structure of employment away from agriculture toward non-farm wage employment.
- H3: Road connectivity reduces the rural poverty headcount in treated habitations.
- H4: Welfare gains are larger for landless and marginal-landholding households, who are more reliant on non-farm wage opportunities accessed via the new road.

1.4. Significance and Organisation

The contribution of the paper is three-fold. First, it provides causal estimates of the household-welfare effects of a flagship Indian infrastructure programme using the population-threshold design first applied to PMGSY by Asher and Novosad (2020), updated with more recent data and matched to standard rural consumption surveys. Second, the comprehensive bandwidth-selection, kernel-choice, and falsification-test strategy follows the modern RD methodology of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) and Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik (2019), making the empirical reasoning fully transparent. Third, the explicit heterogeneity analysis by land class and social group speaks directly to distributional concerns and to the design of rural infrastructure programmes elsewhere in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 sets out the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the data and the RD identification strategy. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. The Theory of Transport and Development

The theoretical case for transport infrastructure as a driver of economic development rests on the classic insight that lower transport costs raise the integrated market size accessible to producers and consumers, generating gains from specialisation and trade. The general-equilibrium analysis of Donaldson (2018), exploiting historical Indian railway expansion, demonstrates that transport infrastructure can substantially raise agricultural income through real-income gains and inter-regional trade. Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) similarly find large welfare effects of U.S. railroad expansion in the late nineteenth century. The theoretical mechanisms lower transport costs, expanded market access, increased division of labour, and induced structural transformation provide a coherent foundation for empirical work on rural roads.

2.2. The Empirical Literature on Rural Roads

Empirical evaluations of rural road programmes in developing countries have produced mixed results, partly because the identification of causal effects is difficult. Khandker, Bakht, and Koolwal (2009) used propensity-score matching and double differences to evaluate rural road projects in Bangladesh, finding measurable effects on consumption

and education. Gibson and Rozelle (2003) examined rural roads in Papua New Guinea and reported large effects on welfare proxies. Mu and van de Walle (2011) used a household panel from Vietnam to demonstrate gains in school enrolment and market participation following road improvements. However, none of these designs exploit a sharp eligibility cutoff, and selection-on-observables identification can be challenged by unobserved confounders.

2.3. The PMGSY Literature

The credibility revolution in rural-road evaluation came with the application of regression discontinuity to PMGSY. Asher and Novosad (2020), in a landmark contribution to the American Economic Review, used the population-threshold rule and a fuzzy RD design on data from over 11,000 villages in the SHRUG (Socioeconomic High-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Platform) database. They report that new road connectivity led to a sharp reallocation of workers out of agriculture into wage employment but did not, in their preferred specification, generate measurable effects on agricultural income or earnings within their sample window. Aggarwal (2018), examining an earlier sample, reports positive effects on agricultural input use, market participation, and educational attainment. Adukia et al. (2020), focusing on schooling, document that PMGSY raised secondary school enrolment and learning outcomes, with effects channelled through reduced returns to traditional rural occupations.

2.4. Methodology: Regression Discontinuity

The theoretical foundations of regression discontinuity go back to Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) but the modern econometric formalisation is due to Hahn et al. (2001), with comprehensive guides provided by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Lee and Lemieux (2010), and the practical-guide series by Cattaneo et al. (2019). The central identification idea is that, near the threshold, treatment status changes discontinuously while all other determinants of the outcome change continuously, so that the average treatment effect at the cutoff can be identified non-parametrically by comparing units just above and just below. Calonico et al. (2014) provided robust bias-corrected confidence intervals that are now standard in applied work. The fuzzy variant, in which treatment compliance is imperfect at the threshold, requires a two-stage local-linear estimator analogous to instrumental variables (Hahn et al., 2001).

2.5. Research Gap

Three gaps motivate the present study. First, although Asher and Novosad (2020) is the seminal contribution, their consumption-related outcomes were limited; the systematic linkage of PMGSY connectivity to NSSO consumption data allows a direct examination of headline welfare measures. Second, the heterogeneity of effects by household landholding, social group, and gender remains under-examined. Third, the most recent rounds of PMGSY implementation, including the 2013–17 Phase II, have not been exploited in many existing analyses. The present paper addresses each of these gaps.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. A Stylised Model of Market Access

Consider a stylised model of a rural household choosing between farm self-employment and outside wage employment in a nearby town. The household faces a fixed transport cost τ per unit of distance to the town. When τ is large as is the case for an unconnected habitation during the monsoon, when fair-weather tracks become unusable the effective non-farm wage is depressed, and the household specialises in subsistence agriculture. When a new all-weather road lowers τ, the effective non-farm wage rises, inducing reallocation of labour out of agriculture. This is the structural-transformation channel emphasised by Asher and Novosad (2020) and by the broader rural-roads literature.

3.2. Welfare Channels

The model implies three welfare channels. First, the income channel: by raising the effective non-farm wage, road connectivity raises household earnings and hence consumption. Second, the price channel: by lowering the transport cost of consumption goods, the real value of any nominal earnings rises further. Third, the price-of-output channel: by allowing higher-value agricultural produce (perishables, dairy, vegetables) to reach markets, road connectivity raises the returns to remaining agricultural activity. Theoretically, the net effect on agricultural employment is ambiguous: while channel three raises returns within agriculture, channel one offers an outside option that pulls labour out. The empirical balance between these channels is the substance of the analysis.

3.3. Testable Implications

Three testable implications follow. First, households in habitations crossing the population eligibility threshold should report higher consumption than households just below the threshold, with the magnitude reflecting the local average treatment effect (LATE) for habitations near the cutoff. Second, the non-farm employment share should rise discontinuously at the threshold. Third, the welfare gain should be larger for households whose initial occupational structure is more responsive to outside wage opportunities typically landless and marginal-landholding households, consistent with H_4.

IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Research Design

The study employs a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, following the formalisation of Hahn et al. (2001) and the practical implementation guide of Cattaneo et al. (2019). The running variable is habitation population recorded in the

2001 Census, which was the basis for PMGSY eligibility determination. The cutoff is c = 1,000 persons in plains areas and c = 500 persons in hill, tribal, and desert areas (the analysis focuses primarily on plains-area habitations, with the hill-area sub-sample reported as a robustness check). Treatment is defined as receipt of an all-weather PMGSY road by 2018, allowing approximately seven years for welfare effects to materialise. Compliance is imperfect because some sub-threshold habitations were connected and some above-threshold habitations were not, requiring the fuzzy rather than sharp variant.

4.2. Data

The empirical analysis combines three data sources. Habitation-level population data are drawn from the 2001 Population Census. PMGSY road-receipt status, work commencement dates, and connectivity status are obtained from the Online Management, Monitoring and Accounting System (OMMAS) maintained by the National Rural Infrastructure Development Agency. Household-level welfare outcomes are obtained by linking PMGSY habitations to the 68th (2011–12) and 77th (2018–19) NSSO Consumer Expenditure and Employment-Unemployment rounds through district and village identifiers. Pre-treatment habitation characteristics road quality, electricity access, baseline literacy are drawn from the 2001 Census village amenities schedule. The final analytical sample comprises approximately 18,400 habitations in plains districts within ±400 persons of the 1,000-person cutoff, matched to roughly 142,000 households.

Table 1. Variable Definitions

Variable	Definition	Source
Running variable	Habitation population (2001 Census), centred at threshold c = 1,000 (plains)	2001 Population Census
Treatment	=1 if habitation received PMGSY all-weather road connectivity by 2018	OMMAS / MoRD
MPCE	Real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure (₹, 2011–12 prices)	NSSO 68th, 77th
Non-farm share	Share of working-age (15–59) adults whose principal activity is non-agricultural (%)	NSSO 68th, 77th
Poverty	=1 if household MPCE < Tendulkar rural poverty line, state-specific	Authors' calculation
Pre-treatment	Electricity access, primary school presence, baseline literacy (2001 Census)	2001 Census

Note. Analytical sample comprises habitations in plains districts within ±400 persons of the 1,000-person eligibility threshold. Author's compilation.

4.3. Empirical Specification

The fuzzy RD estimator is obtained as the ratio of the reduced-form discontinuity in the outcome to the first-stage discontinuity in treatment, both estimated by local-linear regression with the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth (MSE-optimal) and a triangular kernel. The first-stage and reduced-form specifications are:

$$T_{hv} = \alpha_T + \beta_T 1[Pop_v \geq c] + \gamma_T (Pop_v - c) + \delta_T 1[Pop_v \geq c] \cdot (Pop_v - c) + u_{hv} \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{hv} = \alpha_Y + \beta_Y 1[Pop_v \geq c] + \gamma_Y (Pop_v - c) + \delta_Y 1[Pop_v \geq c] \cdot (Pop_v - c) + u_{hv} \quad (2)$$

where T is treatment, Y is the outcome of interest, Pop is habitation population, c = 1,000, and the indicator 1[·] equals one above the threshold. The fuzzy RD estimator of the local average treatment effect is:

$$\hat{\tau} = \frac{\hat{\beta}_Y}{\hat{\beta}_T} \quad (3)$$

Standard errors are computed using the robust bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014) and clustered at the habitation level.

4.4. Identification Tests

The credibility of the RD design rests on three identifying conditions. First, the running variable must not be manipulable by units seeking treatment; this is assessed using the McCrary (2008) density test, which examines whether the density of the running variable is continuous at the cutoff. Second, all pre-determined covariates that affect outcomes must vary continuously at the threshold; this is tested by running the RD specification with each pre-treatment covariate as a placebo outcome and verifying the absence of jumps. Third, the local-linear specification must be appropriate; this is assessed by varying the bandwidth (50 per cent, 100 per cent, 150 per cent of the MSE-optimal value), the kernel (triangular, uniform, Epanechnikov), and the polynomial order (linear, quadratic). Additional robustness exercises include a donut-RD (excluding observations within ±25 persons of the threshold) and placebo cutoffs at non-threshold population values (800, 900, 1,100, 1,200).

4.5. Ethical Considerations

The study uses only publicly available, anonymised secondary data from official sources. No primary human-subjects research is involved. All sources are duly cited.

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Sample Balance

Table 2 reports the means of key variables for habitations within ±100 persons of the 1,000-person threshold, separately for habitations just above and just below. Pre-treatment covariates electricity access, primary school presence, distance to nearest town, baseline literacy are statistically indistinguishable across the cutoff, supporting the assumption of continuity. The probability of receiving a PMGSY road jumps from 23 per cent just below the cutoff to 71 per cent just above, an increase of 48 percentage points that constitutes the first-stage discontinuity.

Table 2. Pre-Treatment Balance and First-Stage Discontinuity

Variable	Below cutoff	Above cutoff	Difference
Pre-treatment covariates			
Electricity access (% habs.)	76.4	77.1	0.7
Primary school present (%)	91.3	92.1	0.8
Distance to town (km)	18.7	18.4	−0.3
Baseline literacy (% 7+)	58.6	59.2	0.6
First-stage discontinuity			
PMGSY road received by 2018 (%)	23.4	71.2	47.8***

Note. Means for habitations within ±100 persons of the 1,000-person eligibility threshold. None of the pre-treatment differences is statistically significant at conventional levels. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Source: 2001 Census; OMMAS; authors' calculations.

5.2. McCrary Density Test

The McCrary (2008) density test produces a discontinuity estimate of −0.038 (SE 0.052, $p = 0.46$), failing to reject the null of no manipulation at the threshold. Visual inspection of the density plot confirms the absence of bunching just above or just below the cutoff. This is consistent with the institutional reality that the running variable 2001 Census population was determined years before PMGSY was announced, eliminating any scope for strategic manipulation. The density test thus provides strong support for the validity of the RD design.

5.3. Main Fuzzy RD Estimates

Table 3 reports the fuzzy RD estimates for the four primary outcomes, with the MSE-optimal bandwidth selected by the procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). The treatment effect on log MPCE is 0.054 (robust SE 0.018, $p = 0.003$), implying that PMGSY road connectivity raised real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure by approximately 5.4 per cent. The effect on the non-farm employment share is 4.8 percentage points ($p = 0.001$), and the effect on the rural poverty headcount is −3.7 percentage points ($p = 0.008$). The first-stage F-statistic of 184.6 confirms that the design is not weak-instrument constrained.

Table 3. Fuzzy RD Estimates of the Effect of PMGSY Road Connectivity

Outcome	RD estimate	Robust SE	p-value	Bandwidth
Log MPCE	0.054***	0.018	0.003	231
Non-farm employment share	0.048***	0.014	0.001	218
Rural poverty headcount	−0.037***	0.014	0.008	245
Female LFPR	0.022*	0.012	0.069	226
First-stage F	184.6	—	<0.001	—
N (habitations)	18,412	—	—	—

Note. Fuzzy RD estimates obtained by local-linear regression with the MSE-optimal bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014), triangular kernel, and robust bias-corrected confidence intervals. Bandwidth in 2001 Census population units. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Source: Author's estimation.

5.4. Heterogeneous Effects

Table 4 explores heterogeneity by household landholding and social group. The consumption gain is largest for landless and marginal-landholding households ($\beta = 0.083$, $p < 0.01$) and statistically zero for medium and large landholders, consistent with H_4 and with the structural-transformation interpretation: landless and marginal households are most reliant on non-farm wage labour, which becomes more accessible when transport costs fall. Heterogeneity by social group shows somewhat larger gains for scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe households than for general-category households, although the differences are smaller in magnitude than the land-class heterogeneity. The pattern is consistent with Asher and Novosad (2020) and with the broader rural-roads literature.

Table 4. Heterogeneous RD Estimates by Subgroup (Outcome: Log MPCE)

Subgroup	RD estimate	Robust SE	p-value
Landless / marginal (≤1 acre)	0.083***	0.022	<0.001
Small (1–2 acres)	0.057**	0.024	0.018
Medium / large (>2 acres)	0.014	0.026	0.591
Scheduled caste / tribe	0.072***	0.025	0.004
Other social groups	0.048**	0.021	0.022
Female-headed households	0.061**	0.029	0.036

Note. Each row reports a fuzzy RD estimate on the indicated subsample. All specifications use the MSE-optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel, and robust bias-corrected standard errors. Source: Author's estimation.

5.5. Robustness and Falsification

Several robustness exercises support the validity of the main findings. First, varying the bandwidth between 50 per cent and 150 per cent of the MSE-optimal value produces estimates of log MPCE within 14 per cent of the baseline. Second, alternative kernels (uniform and Epanechnikov) and a quadratic polynomial produce comparable estimates. Third, a donut-RD excluding observations within ±25 persons of the threshold yields a log-MPCE estimate of 0.058 ($p = 0.009$), confirming that the result is not driven by observations immediately adjacent to the cutoff. Fourth, placebo RD estimates at non-threshold population values (800, 900, 1,100, 1,200) all produce small and statistically insignificant point estimates, ruling out the possibility that the headline result reflects a spurious discontinuity arising from population-related sampling artefacts. Fifth, estimating on the hill-area sub-sample using the 500-person cutoff yields a qualitatively similar but somewhat larger log-MPCE estimate of 0.068, consistent with the higher pre-treatment transport costs in hilly terrain.

5.6. Discussion

The findings advance the rural-roads literature in three respects. First, the consumption effect of approximately 5.4 per cent confirms that PMGSY-induced road connectivity has translated into measurable household-welfare gains, going beyond the structural reallocation documented in Asher and Novosad (2020). Second, the marked heterogeneity by landholding class supports the structural-transformation interpretation: landless and marginal households benefit most because they are most reliant on outside wage opportunities accessed via the new road. Third, the modest but statistically significant effect on female labour force participation is consistent with the literature on transport infrastructure and women's mobility (Borker, 2021).

Three limitations deserve mention. First, the RD estimate identifies a local average treatment effect for habitations near the 1,000-person threshold and may not generalise to substantially smaller or larger habitations, which may have different cost-benefit profiles. Second, the analysis exploits a medium-run window (approximately seven years post-connectivity); longer-run effects on human capital, intergenerational mobility, and out-migration require an extended panel. Third, although the McCrary test fails to reject continuity, residual concerns about population measurement error near the threshold could in principle bias estimates; the consistency of donut-RD results with the baseline alleviates but does not eliminate this concern.

VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study has presented quasi-experimental evidence on the household-welfare effects of rural road connectivity in India using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design that exploits the population-threshold eligibility rule of the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana. Four findings stand out. First, road connectivity raised real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure of newly connected households by approximately 5.4 per cent. Second, it raised the non-farm employment share by 4.8 percentage points, consistent with structural transformation. Third, it reduced the rural poverty headcount by 3.7 percentage points. Fourth, welfare gains are concentrated among landless and marginal-landholding households, with somewhat larger gains for scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe households and for female-headed households.

Four policy implications follow. First, continued investment in last-mile rural road connectivity is justified on welfare grounds, particularly in habitations still unconnected at the conclusion of PMGSY Phase II. Second, the concentration of gains among landless and marginal households strengthens the equity case for the programme and supports the prioritisation of habitations in poorer districts. Third, the structural-transformation effect implies that road investment should be complemented by parallel investments in skill development, vocational education, and small-town labour-market infrastructure to absorb the workers reallocating out of agriculture. Fourth, the modest gains for female-headed households and the female labour force participation effect suggest scope for gender-targeted complementary interventions safe transport services, hostels, vocational training that translate physical connectivity into expanded economic opportunity for women.

Three avenues for future research are particularly promising. First, longer-run evaluation as the post-PMGSY panel extends would illuminate persistence and intergenerational effects. Second, integrated evaluation of PMGSY alongside other rural infrastructure programmes electrification under Saubhagya, telecommunications under BharatNet would help

identify complementarities. Third, structural models that endogenise migration decisions and labour-market spillovers would help map the local average treatment effect identified here to alternative policy counterfactuals.

REFERENCES

Adukia, A., Asher, S., & Novosad, P. (2020). Educational investment responses to economic opportunity: Evidence from Indian road construction. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12*(1), 348–376. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20180036

Aggarwal, S. (2018). Do rural roads create pathways out of poverty? Evidence from India. *Journal of Development Economics, 133*, 375–395. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.01.004

Asher, S., & Novosad, P. (2020). Rural roads and local economic development. *American Economic Review, 110*(3), 797–823. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180268

Borker, G. (2021). *Safety first: Perceived risk of street harassment and educational choices of women* (Policy Research Working Paper No. 9731). World Bank.

Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., & Titiunik, R. (2014). Robust nonparametric confidence intervals for regression-discontinuity designs. *Econometrica, 82*(6), 2295–2326. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11757

Cattaneo, M. D., Idrobo, N., & Titiunik, R. (2019). *A practical introduction to regression discontinuity designs: Foundations*. Cambridge University Press.

Donaldson, D. (2018). Railroads of the Raj: Estimating the impact of transportation infrastructure. *American Economic Review, 108*(4–5), 899–934. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20101199

Donaldson, D., & Hornbeck, R. (2016). Railroads and American economic growth: A "market access" approach. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131*(2), 799–858. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw002

Gibson, J., & Rozelle, S. (2003). Poverty and access to roads in Papua New Guinea. *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52*(1), 159–185. https://doi.org/10.1086/380424

Hahn, J., Todd, P., & Van der Klaauw, W. (2001). Identification and estimation of treatment effects with a regression-discontinuity design. *Econometrica, 69*(1), 201–209. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00183

Imbens, G. W., & Lemieux, T. (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice. *Journal of Econometrics, 142*(2), 615–635. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.001

Khandker, S. R., Bakht, Z., & Koolwal, G. B. (2009). The poverty impact of rural roads: Evidence from Bangladesh. *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 57*(4), 685–722. https://doi.org/10.1086/598765

Lee, D. S., & Lemieux, T. (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics. *Journal of Economic Literature, 48*(2), 281–355. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.48.2.281

McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test. *Journal of Econometrics, 142*(2), 698–714. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005

Ministry of Rural Development. (2023). *Annual report 2022–23*. Government of India.

Mu, R., & van de Walle, D. (2011). Rural roads and local market development in Vietnam. *The Journal of Development Studies, 47*(5), 709–734. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220381003599436

National Sample Survey Office. (2014). *Household consumer expenditure: NSS 68th round (2011–12)*. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India.

National Sample Survey Office. (2020). *Household social consumption: NSS 77th round (2018–19)*. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India.

Thistlethwaite, D. L., & Campbell, D. T. (1960). Regression-discontinuity analysis: An alternative to the ex post facto experiment. *Journal of Educational Psychology, 51*(6), 309–317. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0044319

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC INSIGHTS AND RESEARCH (JEIR)
(Open Access, Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Journal)
ISSN Online: 3107-9482 ISSN Print: 3139-1982

The Impact of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) on Rural Household Welfare and Labour Market Outcomes in India: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Denny CM

Principal, St Mary's College, Puthanangadi, Kerala, India

Article information

Received: 11th February 2026
Received in revised form: 17th March 2026
Accepted: 20th April 2026
Available online: 25th May 2026

Volume: 2
Issue: 2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.63090/JEIR/3107.9482.0021

Abstract

Enacted in 2005, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) provides a legal entitlement of up to 100 days of unskilled wage employment per year to every rural household in India. With cumulative expenditure exceeding ₹8 trillion since inception, MGNREGA is the world's largest public works programme, yet evaluations of its welfare effects remain contested. Exploiting the phased roll-out of the programme across three district cohorts (February 2006, April 2007, and April 2008), this paper estimates the causal effect of MGNREGA exposure on rural household welfare and labour market outcomes using a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) framework. The empirical analysis combines unit-level data from the 61st (2004–05) and 66th (2009–10) rounds of the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) with district-level programme implementation data from the Ministry of Rural Development. The identification strategy compares early-treated (Phase-I) districts with late-treated (Phase-III) districts, controlling for district and time fixed effects, household demographics, and pre-programme trends. Findings indicate that MGNREGA exposure raised real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure by approximately 6.8 per cent, increased real casual-labour wages by 4.5 per cent in the dry season, reduced the rural poverty headcount by an estimated 4.2 percentage points, and raised female labour force participation by 3.1 percentage points among scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe households. Effects are concentrated in low-wage states and among landless and marginal-landholding households. The results are robust to alternative comparison groups, placebo tests on pre-programme cohorts, and a triple-difference specification. The findings provide credible quasi-experimental evidence that workfare programmes can deliver measurable welfare gains when implementation capacity is adequate.

Keywords: - MGNREGA, Public Works, Rural Wages, Poverty, Difference-In-Differences, India.

I. INTRODUCTION

Workfare programmes public schemes that offer employment at a statutory wage to those willing to work have a long pedigree in development policy, ranging from England's Speenhamland system in the late eighteenth century to Maharashtra's Employment Guarantee Scheme of 1972 (Drèze, 1990). The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), enacted in September 2005, transformed this tradition by making rural employment a justiciable right rather than a discretionary scheme (Khera, 2011). The Act guarantees every rural household up to 100 days of unskilled manual work per year at the statutory minimum wage, with one-third of the days reserved for women and an unemployment allowance payable if work cannot be provided within fifteen days of application.

By any measure, MGNREGA is a programme of extraordinary scale. According to the Ministry of Rural Development (2023), the scheme provided employment to roughly 7.2 crore households in 2022–23, generating 2.93 billion person-days of work, with central expenditure of approximately ₹89,400 crore. Cumulative expenditure since 2006 exceeds ₹8 trillion. Despite this scale, opinions on the programme's welfare effects remain sharply divided. Proponents argue that MGNREGA delivers a triple dividend employment, wages, and durable assets and provides crucial insurance to rural households against agro-climatic shocks (Imbert & Papp, 2015; Klonner & Oldiges, 2022). Critics counter that leakages, corruption, and the

displacement of private-sector labour limit the net welfare effects and that the programme imposes substantial fiscal costs that could be allocated more productively (Niehaus & Sukhtankar, 2013; Murgai et al., 2016).

1.1. Research Problem

Although a substantial empirical literature has examined MGNREGA, several issues remain open. First, much of the evidence relies on cross-sectional comparisons that do not credibly identify causal effects, given that the programme was deliberately targeted to backward districts and that household participation is self-selected. Second, the labour-market spillover effects on private-sector wages, labour supply, and migration are theoretically ambiguous and empirically contested (Berg et al., 2018; Imbert & Papp, 2015). Third, distributional questions who gains and who loses have received less attention than aggregate effects. A rigorous quasi-experimental design that addresses these concerns is therefore warranted.

1.2. Research Objectives

The study pursues four interrelated objectives:

- To estimate the causal effect of MGNREGA exposure on real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure among rural households.
- To assess the spillover effect on private-sector casual-labour wages in rural areas, separately by season.
- To examine the impact on female labour force participation, with particular attention to households from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.
- To investigate heterogeneous effects by land class, state, and household demographic composition.

1.3. Research Hypotheses

Four hypotheses are derived from the workfare-with-rationing model developed in Section 3:

- H1: MGNREGA exposure raises real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure of treated rural households relative to controls.
- H2: MGNREGA raises private-sector casual wages in the dry (lean agricultural) season, when the programme is most binding.
- H3: Female labour force participation rises in treated districts, especially among historically marginalised social groups.
- H4: Welfare gains are concentrated among landless and marginal-landholding households in low-wage states.

1.4. Significance and Organisation

The study contributes to the literature on social protection in three respects. First, it deploys a credible identification strategy a Difference-in-Differences design exploiting the phased roll-out of MGNREGA that addresses the principal threats to identification facing earlier work. Second, it integrates analyses of consumption, wages, and labour-supply effects within a unified framework, allowing the welfare effects of the programme to be assessed holistically. Third, the focus on heterogeneity by gender, caste, and land class speaks directly to the distributional concerns raised by Drèze and Khera (2017) and Khera (2011). The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature. Section 3 sets out the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the data, identification strategy, and econometric specification. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Workfare

Workfare programmes have been theorised primarily as self-targeting income-transfer mechanisms. The seminal contribution of Besley and Coate (1992) shows that workfare can dominate pure transfers when the planner cannot directly observe household welfare, provided the programme's effort requirement is sufficiently demanding to deter the non-poor. Ravallion (1991) and Drèze and Sen (1991) extended this argument by emphasising the additional insurance value of workfare in agrarian economies vulnerable to seasonal and weather-related shocks. Comparative work on Argentina's Trabajar (Jalan & Ravallion, 2003) and Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (Bertrand et al., 2004) found measurable consumption-smoothing effects, although displacement of private employment varied widely across contexts.

2.2. Evidence on MGNREGA: Wages and Labour Markets

A substantial body of evidence now exists on the labour-market effects of MGNREGA. Imbert and Papp (2015) used the staggered roll-out across districts and the 61st and 66th NSSO rounds to estimate that the programme raised public-sector employment by 0.3 days per prime-age person per week and increased private-sector casual wages in the dry season by approximately 4.5 per cent. Berg et al. (2018), using high-frequency wage data from Andhra Pradesh, found a similar magnitude of wage effect, with the impact concentrated in agriculturally lean months. Azam (2012) confirmed positive wage effects, with larger gains for female workers, and Zimmermann (2020) further documented that the programme operates as an effective floor on agricultural wages, particularly in distress years.

2.3. Evidence on Consumption, Poverty, and Human Development

Klonner and Oldiges (2022) provided one of the most comprehensive welfare evaluations, finding that MGNREGA reduced the rural poverty headcount by approximately three to five percentage points and produced statistically significant improvements in nutritional intake among scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe households. Ravi and Engler (2015), drawing

on household panel data from Andhra Pradesh, estimated that MGNREGA participation raised monthly per-capita consumption expenditure by 9.6 per cent, with effects concentrated on food and clothing expenditure. Bose (2017) found positive effects on child anthropometric outcomes, mediated through maternal labour supply. Dasgupta (2017) showed that early-childhood exposure to MGNREGA was associated with measurable improvements in height-for-age among children born during the implementation years.

2.4. Critical Perspectives

Not all evaluations have been favourable. Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013) demonstrated that leakages and ghost workers can absorb a non-trivial share of programme outlays, although their estimates vary widely across states and over time. Murgai et al. (2016) argued that an equivalent cash transfer would, under reasonable assumptions, deliver larger welfare gains per rupee spent than the workfare design of MGNREGA, particularly in better-administered states. Sukhtankar (2016) reviewed the political-economy literature and concluded that programme outcomes depend heavily on local state capacity and the quality of social audit institutions.

2.5. Research Gap

Three gaps motivate the present study. First, despite the volume of evaluation work, few studies systematically integrate wage, consumption, and labour-supply effects within a single causal framework. Second, heterogeneity analyses by gender and caste are typically presented as ancillary results rather than as a primary focus. Third, robustness to alternative comparison groups and to the parallel-trends assumption is not always fully documented. The present study addresses each of these gaps.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. A Workfare-with-Rationing Model

The analytical foundation is a stylised model of rural labour markets in which households choose between public-works employment under MGNREGA and private-sector casual employment, subject to rationing on the public side and a downward-sloping demand curve on the private side (Basu, Chau, & Kanbur, 2009). When the MGNREGA wage exceeds the equilibrium private wage and the supply of public-works employment is rationed, the programme has three predictable effects. First, it raises the income of participating households through direct wage payments, with consumption effects mediated by the household's marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income. Second, by absorbing workers out of the private labour market, it shifts private-sector labour supply leftward, raising the equilibrium private wage. Third, because the programme is available year-round but binds primarily in the agricultural lean season, the wage effect should be larger in the dry months.

3.2. Labour Supply Responses and Gender

A complementary mechanism operates through household labour-supply decisions. The collective-household framework of Chiappori (1992) implies that an increase in women's outside options through guaranteed local employment at a statutory wage raises their bargaining position within the household and may increase their labour force participation. MGNREGA's legal one-third reservation for women, combined with provisions for childcare facilities at worksites, is specifically designed to operationalise this mechanism (Drèze & Khera, 2017).

3.3. Testable Implications

Three testable implications follow from the framework. First, treated households should exhibit higher consumption levels than otherwise comparable untreated households, with the largest gains accruing to landless and marginal-landholding groups whose participation is most likely. Second, private-sector casual wages should rise in treated districts during the dry season but exhibit weaker effects during the wet (peak agricultural) season when private demand competes effectively. Third, female labour force participation should rise more than male participation in treated districts, with disproportionate gains among historically marginalised groups.

IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Research Design

The study employs a quasi-experimental Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design (Card & Krueger, 1994; Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The roll-out of MGNREGA in three phases Phase I (200 districts, February 2006), Phase II (130 districts, April 2007), and Phase III (the remaining 295 districts, April 2008) provides a natural source of variation in treatment intensity. The principal comparison is between Phase-I (early-treated) and Phase-III (late-treated) districts, with the pre-period drawn from the 61st (2004–05) NSSO round and the post-period from the 66th (2009–10) round. This design follows the strategy adopted by Imbert and Papp (2015) and refined by Klonner and Oldiges (2022).

4.2. Data

Household-level outcome data are drawn from the unit-level files of the 61st and 66th rounds of the National Sample Survey Office Schedule 10 (Employment and Unemployment) and Schedule 1.0 (Consumer Expenditure). These rounds together cover approximately 1.2 lakh rural households across all major states. District-level programme implementation data including the date of roll-out, person-days generated, and average wage rate are obtained from the Management Information System (MIS) of the Ministry of Rural Development. Variables on weather (rainfall and temperature) are drawn from the India Meteorological Department, and pre-programme socio-economic controls are obtained from the 2001 Population Census. All monetary variables are deflated to 2011–12 prices using state-specific rural consumer price indices.

4.3. Sample and Variables

Table 1. Variable Definitions

Variable	Definition	Source
MPCE	Real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure (₹, 2011–12 prices)	NSSO Schedule 1.0
Casual wage	Real daily casual-labour wage by season (dry / wet)	NSSO Schedule 10
Poverty	Headcount poverty (Tendulkar rural poverty line, state-specific)	Authors' calculation
Female LFPR	Female labour force participation rate (15–59 years, principal+subsidiary)	NSSO Schedule 10
Treatment	=1 if district in Phase-I roll-out, 0 if Phase-III; =1 in 2009–10, 0 in 2004–05	MoRD MIS
Controls	HH size, dependency ratio, head's education, social group, land class, rainfall	NSSO; IMD; Census

Note. Monetary variables deflated using state-specific rural CPI (Base: 2011–12). Author's compilation.

4.4. Empirical Specification

The baseline DiD specification is estimated at the household level:

$$Y_{idt} = \alpha + \beta(\text{Phase1}_d \times \text{Post}_t) + \gamma X_{idt} + \delta_d + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{idt} \quad (1)$$

where Y is the outcome of interest (log MPCE, log wage, poverty indicator, or female LFPR) for household i in district d at time t; Phase1_d is a binary indicator equal to one if the district was rolled out in Phase I; Post_t equals one for 2009–10 observations; X is a vector of household and district controls; δ_d denotes district fixed effects; λ_t denotes year fixed effects; and ε is the idiosyncratic error term. The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the average treatment effect on the treated under the parallel-trends assumption. Standard errors are clustered at the district level following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) to address serial correlation.

4.5. Identification and Robustness

Credible identification requires that, absent the programme, outcomes in Phase-I and Phase-III districts would have evolved in parallel. Because districts were ranked by a backwardness index in the original Planning Commission allocation, Phase-I districts are systematically poorer than Phase-III districts; however, the DiD design differences out time-invariant differences in levels. Pre-programme trends are verified using a placebo test on the 55th (1999–2000) and 61st (2004–05) NSSO rounds, when no district was treated. A triple-difference specification interacting treatment with land-class indicators provides additional identification by leveraging variation in expected programme intensity within districts.

4.6. Ethical Considerations

All data are anonymised unit-level secondary records that are publicly accessible from the NSSO and the Ministry of Rural Development. No primary human-subjects research is involved. All sources are duly cited.

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Balance

Table 2 reports pre-programme means and standard deviations for outcomes and key covariates, separately for Phase-I and Phase-III districts. In 2004–05, Phase-I districts were measurably poorer than Phase-III districts: real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure was ₹612 in Phase-I against ₹758 in Phase-III, and the rural poverty headcount was 47.3 per cent against 36.1 per cent. These differences confirm that the original Planning Commission targeting was effective in directing the programme to backward districts. They also underscore the need for a DiD rather than cross-sectional design.

Table 2. Pre-Programme Descriptive Statistics (Rural Households, 2004–05)

Variable	Phase I	Phase III	Difference
MPCE (₹, 2011–12 prices)	612	758	−146***
Daily casual wage – dry season (₹)	58.4	72.6	−14.2***
Poverty headcount (%)	47.3	36.1	11.2***
Female LFPR (%)	28.6	31.4	−2.8**
Household size	5.32	4.98	0.34**
SC/ST household share (%)	32.8	24.5	8.3***
Landless / marginal (%)	58.7	52.3	6.4***

Note. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Authors' calculation using NSSO 61st round unit-level data.

5.2. Main DiD Estimates

Table 3 reports the baseline DiD estimates for the four primary outcomes. The interaction term Phase1 × Post is positive and statistically significant for log MPCE ($\beta = 0.068$, $p < 0.01$), implying that early roll-out raised real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure by approximately 6.8 per cent relative to the late-treated comparison group. The estimated effect on real dry-season casual wages is 0.045 ($p < 0.05$), corresponding to a 4.5 per cent wage premium in the lean season; the wet-season effect is smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The poverty headcount falls by 4.2 percentage points ($p < 0.01$), and female labour force participation rises by 3.1 percentage points ($p < 0.05$). The pattern is consistent with H_1–H_3.

Table 3. Baseline Difference-in-Differences Estimates

Outcome	β (Phase1×Post)	Std. Error	p-value	N
Log MPCE	0.068***	0.019	0.001	82,431
Log casual wage (dry season)	0.045**	0.021	0.033	28,164
Log casual wage (wet season)	0.018	0.024	0.451	26,872
Poverty headcount	−0.042***	0.013	0.002	82,431
Female LFPR	0.031**	0.014	0.029	82,431

Note. All specifications include district and year fixed effects, household controls (size, dependency ratio, head's education, social group, land class), and a rainfall control. Standard errors clustered at the district level. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Source: Authors' estimation using NSSO 61st and 66th round unit-level data.

5.3, Heterogeneous Effects

Table 4 explores heterogeneity by land class and social group. The MPCE gain is concentrated among landless and marginal-landholding households ($\beta = 0.092$, $p < 0.01$), while the effect among medium and large landholders is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This pattern is consistent with the self-targeting logic of workfare (Besley & Coate, 1992) and confirms H_4. Disaggregation by social group reveals that scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe households experience larger gains than the rest of the rural population on both consumption ($\beta = 0.087$) and female labour force participation ($\beta = 0.048$). These distributional patterns mirror those reported in Klonner and Oldiges (2022) and reinforce the equity case for the programme.

Table 4. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Subgroup	Log MPCE	Poverty	Female LFPR
Landless / marginal (≤1 acre)	0.092***	−0.058***	0.042**
Small (1–2 acres)	0.054**	−0.031*	0.025
Medium / large (>2 acres)	0.012	−0.008	0.011
Scheduled caste / tribe	0.087***	−0.061***	0.048***
Other social groups	0.058**	−0.031**	0.022*

Note. Each cell reports the coefficient on Phase1 × Post from a separate regression on the indicated subsample. All specifications include the same controls and fixed effects as Table 3. Source: Authors' estimation.

5.4. Robustness Checks

Several robustness exercises support the validity of the main findings. First, a placebo DiD using the 55th (1999–2000) and 61st (2004–05) NSSO rounds when no district was treated produces statistically insignificant placebo coefficients ($\beta = 0.008$, $p = 0.61$ for log MPCE), supporting the parallel-trends assumption. Second, restricting the comparison to Phase-II districts produces qualitatively similar but smaller estimates, as expected given the shorter treatment differential. Third, a triple-difference specification that adds a landless × Phase1 × Post interaction confirms that gains are concentrated among the most likely participants. Fourth, results are robust to including state-by-year fixed effects and to dropping high-leakage states identified in Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013).

5.5. Discussion

The pattern of results is consistent with the workfare-with-rationing framework outlined in Section 3. The pronounced seasonality of the wage effect positive and significant in the dry season, negligible in the wet season accords with Imbert and Papp (2015) and provides indirect evidence that the programme is most binding when private-sector demand is weakest. The concentration of consumption gains among landless and marginal-landholding households is consistent with self-targeting, since the opportunity cost of public-works employment is lowest for these groups. The robust female-labour-force-participation effect, particularly among scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe households, reinforces the gender-equity case made by Drèze and Khera (2017).

Two limitations deserve mention. First, the available NSSO rounds permit a medium-term evaluation only; longer-run effects on human capital formation, intergenerational mobility, and rural-urban migration require panel data of greater duration than was available at the time of writing. Second, the analysis cannot fully separate the direct income effects of programme participation from general-equilibrium effects on wages, although the inclusion of district fixed effects, year fixed effects, and

a battery of controls limits the scope for confounding. These limitations point toward fruitful directions for future research using longer panels and structural models.

VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study has presented quasi-experimental evidence on the welfare effects of MGNREGA using a Difference-in-Differences design that exploits the phased roll-out of the programme across district cohorts. Four findings stand out. First, the programme raised real monthly per-capita consumption expenditure in treated districts by approximately 6.8 per cent. Second, it raised real casual-labour wages in the agricultural lean season by 4.5 per cent. Third, it lowered the rural poverty headcount by 4.2 percentage points. Fourth, it produced statistically significant gains in female labour force participation, with effects concentrated among scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe households and among landless and marginal-landholding groups.

Three policy implications follow. First, the workfare design often criticised on efficiency grounds delivers self-targeting and labour-market spillovers that a pure cash transfer cannot easily replicate. Reforming MGNREGA toward a cash-transfer model would risk eroding precisely these benefits. Second, the variation in programme outcomes across states, well documented in Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013) and Sukhtankar (2016), implies that strengthening implementation capacity particularly social audits, timely wage payment, and Aadhaar-based payment systems is essential to translate scheme outlays into welfare gains. Third, the demonstrated gains in female labour force participation suggest that the gender provisions of MGNREGA, including the one-third reservation and worksite childcare, deliver measurable empowerment dividends that should be retained and strengthened.

Three directions for future research are particularly promising. First, integrating administrative MIS data with household panel surveys would permit a more granular analysis of participation dynamics. Second, the long-run human-capital effects on schooling, nutrition, and intergenerational mobility warrant evaluation as longer panels become available. Third, the interaction of MGNREGA with other social-protection programmes such as the Public Distribution System and the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana is an open question of considerable policy relevance.

REFERENCES

Angrist, J. D., J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). *Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion*. Princeton University Press.

Azam, M. (2012). *The impact of Indian job guarantee scheme on labor market outcomes: Evidence from a natural experiment* (IZA Discussion Paper No. 6548). Institute of Labor Economics.

Basu, A. K., Chau, N. H., & Kanbur, R. (2009). A theory of employment guarantees: Contestability, credibility and distributional concerns. *Journal of Public Economics, 93*(3–4), 482–497.

Berg, E., Bhattacharyya, S., Rajasekhar, D., & Manjula, R. (2018). Can public works increase equilibrium wages? Evidence from India's National Rural Employment Guarantee. *World Development, 103*, 239–254. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.027

Berhane, G., Gilligan, D. O., Hoddinott, J., Kumar, N., & Taffesse, A. S. (2014). Can social protection work in Africa? The impact of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme. *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 63*(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1086/677753

Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119*(1), 249–275. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839588

Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1992). Workfare versus welfare: Incentive arguments for work requirements in poverty-alleviation programs. *The American Economic Review, 82*(1), 249–261.

Bose, N. (2017). Raising consumption through India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. *World Development, 96*, 245–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.03.010

Card, D., & Krueger, A. B. (1994). Minimum wages and employment: A case study of the fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. *The American Economic Review, 84*(4), 772–793.

Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. *Journal of Political Economy, 100*(3), 437–467. https://doi.org/10.1086/261825

Dasgupta, A. (2017). *Can major public works policy buffer negative shocks in early childhood? Evidence from India's NREGS* (WIDER Working Paper No. 2017/171). United Nations University–WIDER.

Drèze, J. (1990). Famine prevention in India. In Drèze, J. & Sen, A. (Eds.), *The political economy of hunger* (Vol. 2, pp. 13–122). Clarendon Press.

Drèze, J., & Khera, R. (2017). Recent social security initiatives in India. *World Development, 98*, 555–572. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.035

Drèze, J., & Sen, A. (1991). Public action for social security: Foundations and strategy. In E. Ahmad, Drèze, J., J. Hills, & Sen, A. (Eds.), *Social security in developing countries* (pp. 3–40). Clarendon Press.

Imbert, C., & Papp, J. (2015). Labor market effects of social programs: Evidence from India's employment guarantee. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7*(2), 233–263. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20130401

Jalan, J., & Ravallion, M. (2003). Estimating the benefit incidence of an antipoverty program by propensity-score matching. *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 21*(1), 19–30. https://doi.org/10.1198/073500102288618720

The Battle for Employment Guarantee Khera, R. (Ed.). (2011). *The battle for employment guarantee*. Oxford University Press.

Klonner, S., & Oldiges, C. (2022). The welfare effects of India's rural employment guarantee. *Journal of Development Economics, 157*, Article 102848. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102848

Ministry of Rural Development (2023). *MGNREGA annual report 2022–23*. Government of India.

Murgai, R., Ravallion, M., & van de Walle, D. (2016). Is workfare cost-effective against poverty in a poor labor-surplus economy? *The World Bank Economic Review, 30*(3), 413–445.

National Sample Survey Office (2006). *Employment and unemployment situation in India: NSS 61st round (2004–05)*. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India.

National Sample Survey Office (2011). *Employment and unemployment situation in India: NSS 66th round (2009–10)*. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India.

Niehaus, P., & Sukhtankar, S. (2013). Corruption dynamics: The golden goose effect. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5*(4), 230–269. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.4.230

Ravallion, M. (1991). Reaching the rural poor through public employment: Arguments, evidence, and lessons from South Asia. *The World Bank Research Observer, 6*(2), 153–175. https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/6.2.153

Ravi, S., & Engler, M. (2015). Workfare as an effective way to fight poverty: The case of India's NREGS. *World Development, 67*, 57–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.09.029

Sukhtankar, S. (2016). India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: What do we really know about the world's largest workfare program? *India Policy Forum, 13*(1), 231–286.

Zimmermann, L. (2020). *Why guarantee employment? Evidence from a large Indian public-works program* (GLO Discussion Paper No. 504). Global Labor Organization.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC INSIGHTS AND RESEARCH (JEIR)
(Open Access, Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Journal)
ISSN Online: 3107-9482 ISSN Print: 3139-1982

Social Security Policies, Programs and Schemes in India

Umesh K

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Government College Madappally, Kozhikode, Kerala, India

Article information

Received: 12th February 2026
Received in revised form: 16th March 2026
Accepted: 18th April 2026
Available online: 25th May 2026

Volume: 2
Issue: 2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.63090/JEIR/3107.9482.0022

Abstract

Social security is one of the principal mechanisms through which a society upholds the dignity of its citizens. Its core components are social assistance, social insurance, social protection, and social safety nets for those who are poor, elderly, unemployed, pregnant, ill, disabled, orphaned, or otherwise vulnerable. By providing public assistance, social security systems guarantee a minimum standard of living for the general population, and adequate, timely funding is essential to sustaining them. This paper reviews the major social security policies, programmes, and schemes in India, including the Public Distribution System (PDS), the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY), the Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana (PMJJBY), the Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana (PMSBY), the Atal Pension Yojana (APY), the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY), the Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana National Rural Livelihood Mission (DAYNRLM), and the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana Scheme (PMUYS), among others. Drawing on government reports, official dashboards, and published literature, it describes each scheme's objectives, coverage, and implementation, and considers what an understanding of these measures reveals about efforts to improve the living standards of the people.

Keywords: Annapurna, Awas Yojana, Jan Dhan Yojana, social security, Ujjwala Yojana.

I. INTRODUCTION

Social security protects individuals and ensures access to healthcare and economic security, particularly during old age, unemployment, illness, injury, disability, maternity, and other life events. In the event of illness or disability, unemployment, crop failure, the death of a spouse, or retirement, it offers monetary compensation, and its benefits may also be provided in cash for medical needs, rehabilitation, in-home assistance during illness, legal aid, and funeral costs. Through support and insurance, social security programmes act as a facilitator that helps individuals plan for their own futures. India's social security system is made up of schemes and initiatives dispersed across numerous laws and regulations; it relieves distress and serves as a safeguard against harm or loss (Saritha, 2022).

During ancient and medieval times in India, social and religious groups established systems of protection for the poor and disadvantaged members of their communities, reflecting a belief that society bears a moral, religious, and spiritual obligation towards its weaker sections. Today, governments and non-governmental organisations work to ensure social security for the weaker and impoverished segments of society by fostering a sense of civic and ethical duty. Over the past fifteen years, social security laws and programmes in India have expanded as part of a broader recognition of socio-economic rights, and the system has been greatly enlarged through school meals, child-care facilities, employment-guarantee programmes, food subsidies, and social security pensions, all of which place a high value on human security and well-being (Jean, 2017).

II. REVIEW

This study is based on a review of books, journals, articles, periodicals, government reports, and official dashboards undertaken to understand the range of social security policies, programmes, and schemes that protect and promote the marginalised sections of Indian society. The idea of social security has deep roots in India: the ancient text Manusmriti set out

guidelines for public safety, and the Hindu joint-family system, often described as the original cell of security and the first line of defence against adversity, was closely linked to the notion of collective protection. During the Vedic era, guilds worked to protect people and property in times of disaster. Over time, these informal arrangements gave way to organised, statutory social security programmes designed to safeguard individuals against unemployment, illness, disability, and work-related injury, with the twin aims of protecting social fairness and human dignity while ensuring financial and health security.

III. OBJECTIVES

- To examine the major social security schemes in India;
- To distinguish the schemes directed at women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities;
- To review the principal poverty-eradication programmes in India;
- To identify the major social security pension schemes in India; and
- To assess the significance of the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana scheme.

IV. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

India's vast and diverse population poses a significant obstacle to designing and implementing social security policies and programmes that meet the needs of every section of society. Diverse socio-economic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds make it difficult to reach different population groups, and many eligible recipients remain unaware of the programmes available to them. Conventional bureaucratic obstacles and administrative inefficiencies delay effective delivery, while complex application procedures and drawn-out approval processes discourage beneficiaries.

Systemic corruption causes funds to leak and be diverted, so ensuring accountability and transparency is a further challenge. Limited financial resources constrain the coverage of social security programmes, and inadequate coverage creates a range of problems in service delivery. Weak technology infrastructure compounds these difficulties: a lack of digital literacy and connectivity restricts access to online services and the distribution of benefits in certain areas (Kumar & Shobana, 2024).

V. SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE

An understanding of India's various social security policies, programmes, and schemes offers insight into how far they have improved the living standards of the people. As a result of welfare-oriented politics, modern governments extend social security to marginalised sections of society, including the poor, the elderly, the unemployed, the disabled, children, and women. The COVID-19 pandemic deepened poverty, reduced employment opportunities, and heightened labour-market risks, while informality, unemployment, non-standard forms of work, and an ageing population continue to hamper the expansion of the social security system.

Improving the effectiveness and quality of social services therefore requires stronger social management. Inadequate and inequitable protection, the political and economic climate, labour and demographic trends, administrative inefficiencies, and financial management remain the central concerns of social security, and the rapid expansion of services for the elderly places further pressure on budget allocation, labour-force participation, and the needs of older people (Elics, 2024). Because the proportion of unorganised workers in India is very high, and because provision has tended to rely one-dimensionally on cash transfers, the country's greatest social protection challenge lies in meeting a vast range of needs; anti-poverty strategies must therefore be combined with social protection measures (Rajasekhar, 2020).

VI. METHODOLOGY

The study adopts both qualitative and quantitative approaches, combining descriptive, analytical, and historical methods. It relies on secondary sources, with data drawn from government reports and official dashboards, newspapers, books, journals, and articles. The quantitative material, principally official scheme dashboards and parliamentary records, is used to describe the coverage and implementation of the major schemes, while the qualitative material situates them within the wider institutional and historical context of social security in India.

VII.POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND SCHEMES: DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

7.1. Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY)

The PMAY programme aims to give middle-class and low-income Indian households access to affordable housing. It was a response to rapid urbanisation and the shortage of housing in rural areas, and it seeks to improve the quality of life of the country's economically weaker and lower-income groups. The urban housing problem has been shaped by rural residents moving to cities in search of work and education, and by the growing mismatch between the supply of and demand for homes; rising urban real-estate costs have put home ownership beyond the reach of many. Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched PMAY for all urban and rural poor, including those living in slums, on 25 June 2015 (Ajith, 2021).

Under PMAY Urban, every urban poor household was to be guaranteed a pucca dwelling with basic amenities. The scheme's main target groups were the urban middle-income group (MIG), the lower-income group (LIG), and the economically weaker sections (EWS), and beneficiaries received interest subsidies on home loans for the construction or purchase of a house, with subsidy rates determined by the beneficiary's income. The scheme promotes innovative and sustainable building technologies to ensure cost-effectiveness and quality in construction, and it incorporates online monitoring to track the progress of housing projects, thereby ensuring transparency and accountability. By making women co-owners of the houses provided, PMAY also advances the socio-economic empowerment of women (Himadri & Koley, 2024).

7.2. Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana (PMJJBY) and Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana (PMSBY)

The PMJJBY provides affordable life insurance cover, while the PMSBY provides accidental death and disability cover. Launched under the Jan-Dhan Se Jan Suraksha programme, these two schemes protect low-income households from the economic shocks caused by the loss of life or personal accident, and they have been praised for their affordability and accessibility. According to Ministry of Finance figures, only 20 per cent of residents held life insurance, 11 per cent of workers were enrolled in pension plans, and only 4 per cent of citizens were covered by accident insurance; to extend insurance to everyone, and to rural and unorganised workers in particular, the Government of India launched the PMSBY for accidental death and disability and the PMJJBY for life insurance.

Individuals between the ages of 18 and 50 are eligible for both schemes; they must hold a savings account, and cover under PMJJBY continues until the age of 55. The PMJJBY provides life insurance worth Rs 2 lakhs for an annual premium of Rs 330, and all holders of a joint account may enrol by contributing Rs 330 each. The PMSBY is open to Indian nationals between the ages of 18 and 70 and provides risk cover of Rs 1 lakh for partial disability and Rs 2 lakh for total disability or accidental death, for an annual premium of just Rs 12; the cover runs for one year (Chinmay & Tollawalla, 2022).

Table 1. States/UTs-wise Beneficiaries Registered under PMJJBY and PMSBY

Sl. No.	States / UTs	PMJJBY	PMSBY
1	Andaman & Nicobar Islands	36107	81747
2	Andhra Pradesh	7229964	16928646
3	Arunachal Pradesh	94230	175202
4	Assam	2173747	6148941
5	Bihar	6234095	16651031
6	Chandigarh	83968	270779
7	Chhattisgarh	2930597	8260236
8	Dadra & Nagar Haveli	50825	91803
9	Daman & Diu	38289	68093
10	Delhi	1461022	3967479
11	Goa	173650	397311
12	Gujarat	4684017	10916075
13	Haryana	2319157	5978608
14	Himachal Pradesh	560015	1820397
15	Jammu & Kashmir	461107	1127052
16	Jharkhand	2711249	6960770
17	Karnataka	5521316	11847294
18	Kerala	1185302	5871142
19	Ladakh	12485	24540
20	Lakshadweep	2919	8207
21	Madhya Pradesh	6427790	18760378
22	Maharashtra	8148550	19399681
23	Manipur	113597	282847
24	Meghalaya	178864	379858
25	Mizoram	136124	224958
26	Nagaland	99756	255995
27	Odisha	3795489	10480969
28	Puducherry	109449	269565
29	Punjab	2227253	7106296
30	Rajasthan	5434511	14684686
31	Sikkim	68811	146690
32	Tamil Nadu	4760091	12787836
33	Telangana	4356952	10206943
34	Tripura	274687	864359
35	Uttar Pradesh	11798737	38836868
36	Uttarakhand	701480	2814180
37	West Bengal	5394980	17206833

Source: Rajya Sabha session 257 unstarred question No 2160, Government of India, as on 05/12/2022

Among the Indian states, the highest number of beneficiaries registered under the PMJJBY was in Uttar Pradesh, at 11798737, and Uttar Pradesh also recorded the largest number under the PMSBY, at 38836868. Among the union territories, the largest numbers were in Jammu and Kashmir, with 461107 beneficiaries under the PMJJBY and 1127052 under the PMSBY. In Kerala, 1185302 people were registered under the PMJJBY and 5871142 under the PMSBY, while in the National Capital Territory of Delhi the figures were 1461022 and 3967479 respectively.

7.3. Atal Pension Yojana (APY)

Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced the Atal Pension Yojana in 2015 to give workers in the unorganised and informal sector a guaranteed income in old age. The scheme guarantees a monthly pension of between Rs 1,000 and Rs 5,000, which is a significant step towards income security for the elderly. It is overseen by the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) and is a specially designed National Pension System (NPS) model intended to make the NPS readily accessible to socially disadvantaged groups (Balamurugan, 2022).

Other programmes that provide financial assistance to informal workers include the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme (IGNOAPS), the Public Provident Fund (PPF), the Unit Trust of India (UTI), and the Retirement Benefit Pension (RBP). IGNOAPS recipients receive only a modest pension; the PPF deposit has a fifteen-year term and its funds were easily diverted; and, being relatively new, the RBP and UTI faced regulatory difficulties (Sant & Kundu, 2018).

Table 2. Gender-wise Enrolment Under Atal Pension Yojana

SL No	Gender	Number in Lakhs	Percentage
1	Male	280	54.78
2	Female	231	45.19

Source: Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, Atal Pension Yojana Dashboard as on 28/02/2023

According to the gender-wise enrolment under the Atal Pension Yojana as on 28 February 2023, male enrolments numbered 280 lakhs, or 54.78 per cent of all APY beneficiaries, while female enrolments numbered 231 lakhs, or 45.19 per cent. Male enrolment thus exceeded female enrolment by 49 lakhs.

Table 3. Pension Amount-wise Enrolment Under Atal Pension Yojana, Beneficiaries in Lakhs

SL No	Pension Amount	Beneficiaries	Percentage
1	1000	421	82.42
2	2000	19	3.88
3	3000	9	1.87
4	4000	3	0.71
5	5000	56	11.11

Source: Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, Atal Pension Yojana Dashboard as of 28 February 2023.

In the pension-amount-wise distribution of beneficiaries under the Atal Pension Yojana, the largest group chose the Rs 1,000 pension, accounting for 82.42 per cent (421 lakhs). The next largest chose the Rs 5,000 pension, at 11.11 per cent (56 lakhs), followed by the Rs 2,000 pension at 3.88 per cent (19 lakhs) and the Rs 3,000 pension at 1.87 per cent (9 lakhs). The smallest group chose the Rs 4,000 pension, at 0.71 per cent (3 lakhs).

7.4. Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY)

The PMJDY gives economically disadvantaged people access to financial services, covering bank and deposit accounts, insurance, and pensions. Launched as part of the financial-inclusion agenda on 28 August 2014, it seeks to link as many people as possible with banks, build their financial literacy, and help them benefit from even modest savings, thereby bringing the economically disadvantaged into the mainstream of development. It proved a great success in rural areas, where public-sector banks had a strong presence, and 15 million bank accounts were opened on the day of its launch.

PMJDY provides a RuPay debit card that can be used for payments and purchases. The scheme entered the Guinness Book of World Records for the most bank accounts opened in a single week as part of a financial-inclusion campaign, with 1,80,96,130 accounts opened by the Government of India between 23 and 28 August 2014. Its slogan is 'Mera Khata, Bhagya Vidhata'. PMJDY has been a game-changer for the economy, providing the platform for Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT), which helps to plug leakages in subsidies and thereby generate savings for the exchequer (Kamini, 2023).

The PMJDY offers a RuPay debit card with built-in accident insurance cover of Rs 1 lakh, a RuPay Kisan card, and an overdraft facility of Rs 5,000. Zero-balance accounts are permitted, and account holders receive a kit containing a chequebook and passbook, a debit card usable for online purchases, access to mobile banking, eligibility for an additional loan of Rs 15,000, and a competitive rate of interest on deposits. Rooted in the developmental vision of 'Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas', the scheme makes financial services readily and universally accessible to all households, urban and rural alike, and has produced remarkable results in the banking sector by helping to end financial untouchability (Rajeshwari, 2016).

7.5. Pradhan Mantri Vaya Vandana Yojana (PMVVY)

The Government of India introduced the Pradhan Mantri Vaya Vandana Yojana on 4 May 2017. It is a government pension plan designed to provide social security to senior citizens, guaranteeing an annual return of 7.40 per cent paid monthly and offering loans of up to 75 per cent of the purchase price. PMVVY permits early exit for the treatment of a serious or terminal illness affecting the subscriber or spouse, and if the pensioner dies within the ten-year policy term the nominee receives the benefits. The policy runs for ten years, the maximum investment is Rs 15 lakhs, and the monthly pension ranges from a minimum of Rs 1,000 to a maximum of Rs 10,000.

The scheme's returns are entirely exempt from GST, and if a pensioner dies during the policy term the beneficiary receives the full amount invested. The maximum entry age is 80 years, and existing PMJJBY and PMSBY policyholders may also apply provided they meet the age criterion of 60 to 80 years. There is no minimum-income requirement for PMVVY, although those already receiving a pension from another source and those who have opted for the Atal Pension Yojana (APY) are excluded. The government guarantees the investment, giving subscribers the assurance that their money is safe even amid market fluctuations, and the premiums paid and pensions received under the scheme qualify for certain tax benefits (Mukul, 2020).

7.6. Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY)

Introduced in 2007, the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana was India's largest health-insurance programme, covering more than 37 million poor families. Launched by the Ministry of Labour and Employment to give below-poverty-line (BPL) families access to health insurance, it protects such households from the financial burden of hospitalisation. Its beneficiaries are BPL unorganised workers and their families, who are issued smart cards for easy identification. The scheme provides annual cover of Rs 30,000 per family for in-patient care, covers all pre-existing conditions, and reimburses transport costs of Rs 1,000; the cost of the smart card is met by the central government. The central government contributes 75 per cent of the annual premium and the state governments 25 per cent, while administrative and associated costs are borne by the states (Rajesh, 2018).

Beneficiaries may choose their hospital, and the insurer empanels both public and private institutions, with treatment covered up to Rs 30,000. This large programme marks a significant departure from India's conventional public health-care delivery system; its extensive use of private insurers and its technological sophistication, exemplified by the use of smart cards, set it apart from other public welfare initiatives in the country (Zubin et al., 2015).

7.7. The Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana National Rural Livelihood Mission (DAYNRLM)

The DAYNRLM is a flagship poverty-alleviation programme in India that seeks to reduce poverty by empowering rural poor households through sustainable livelihoods. By building strong grassroots institutions, it provides the poor with access to gainful self-employment and skilled wage employment. Implemented by the Ministry of Rural Development, it focuses on organising the rural poor into self-help groups (SHGs).

The NRLM concentrates on creating and strengthening SHGs and on empowering women and other marginalised groups, and it promotes the financial inclusion of the rural poor by enabling them to save, borrow, and invest in their livelihoods. It supports diversified livelihood options such as agriculture and livestock and the social mobilisation of the poor, including women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and persons with disabilities, and it provides capacity building and skills training. The scheme also allows states to formulate their own policies to advance social inclusion and social development (Ashutosh et al., 2023).

By strengthening sustainable livelihoods and improving access to financial services, the NRLM seeks to establish effective institutional platforms for the rural poor and to raise household incomes. Organising all poor households into functional SHGs and their federations, it aims to end rural poverty and represents an effective means of delivering social and economic support to the underprivileged with the best possible outcomes (Patil, 2021).

7.8. Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana Scheme (PMUYS)

The Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana Scheme was established in May 2016 to protect the health of women and children by supplying them with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), a clean cooking fuel. Drawing on the 2011 Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC), the scheme initially aimed to give free LPG connections to five crore below-poverty-line (BPL) women, a target later raised to eight crore under the Extended PMUY. It offers a loan facility for the stove's purchase price and the first refill. Across the states and union territories, PMUY granted 3.81 crore LPG connections and E-PMUY a further 3.38 crore, and the share of India using LPG rose from 61.90 per cent in May 2016 to 94.30 per cent in April 2019 (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2019).

To encourage the use of clean cooking fuel, PMUYS offers BPL families free LPG connections, and more than 2.3 million consumers have benefited from the scheme. By freeing women in poor households from smoke, it advances the United Nations' seventh Sustainable Development Goal of clean energy by 2030 and reflects the government's commitment to the safety, service, and support of Indian women. The scheme has reached some of the most vulnerable segments of society, changing cooking practices and health outcomes, saving time and energy, and contributing to the empowerment of women (Anvish, 2024).

Table 4. States/UTs-wise Number of Connections Released Under PMUYS

Sl. No.	States / UTs	PMUYS
1	Andaman & Nicobar Islands	13,824
2	Andhra Pradesh	9,71,176
3	Arunachal Pradesh	53,797
4	Assam	50,97,753
5	Bihar	1,16,30,709
6	Chandigarh	2027
7	Chhattisgarh	38,01,995
8	Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu	17,798
9	Delhi	2,59,720
10	Goa	1956
11	Gujarat	43,09,053
12	Haryana	11,15,148
13	Himachal Pradesh	1,50,774
14	Jammu & Kashmir	12,69,896
15	Jharkhand	38,95,898
16	Karnataka	41,47,354
17	Kerala	3,87,835
18	Ladakh	11,086
19	Lakshadweep	361
20	Madhya Pradesh	88,47,291
21	Maharashtra	52,17,443
22	Manipur	2,24,987
23	Meghalaya	3,17,156
24	Mizoram	36,007
25	Nagaland	1,22,152
26	Odisha	55,50,211
27	Puducherry	19,350
28	Punjab	13,59,320
29	Rajasthan	73,82,580
30	Sikkim	19,892
31	Tamil Nadu	41,00,363
32	Telangana	11,85,878
33	Tripura	3,16,468
34	Uttar Pradesh	1,85,95,383
35	Uttarakhand	5,30,163
36	West Bengal	1,23,76,143

Source: Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Government of India, Rajya Sabha session 266 Unstarred question No. 2358, answered on 16/12/2024, published on 28/02/2025.

According to Rajya Sabha session 266, Unstarred Question No. 2358, answered on 16 December 2024 and published on 28 February 2025, the largest number of connections under the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana Scheme was granted in Uttar Pradesh, at 1,85,95,383, and the smallest in Goa, at 1956. Kerala received 3,87,835 connections. Among the union territories, the highest number was in Jammu and Kashmir, at 12,69,896, and the lowest in Lakshadweep, at 361.

7.9. Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY)

The Antyodaya Anna Yojana was introduced in December 2000 for the poorest sections of the below-poverty-line population. To provide food grains to low-income households as a legal entitlement, Parliament passed the National Food Security Act in 2013, making the right to food legally enforceable. The supply of food grains to recipients is a shared responsibility of the central and state governments: the central government purchases grain from farmers at the minimum support price (MSP) and sells it to the states at the central issue price, and it is responsible for transporting grain to godowns in each state, while the states move it from those godowns to ration shops, where beneficiaries buy it at the reduced central issue price.

Figure 1: The Process of Public Distribution



Source: Food Corporation of India

The Antyodaya Anna Yojana secures the food and nutritional needs of the underprivileged. It helps keep food prices stable and gives poor households access to affordable food, and when production falls it draws on a buffer stock of food grains held in warehouses. In this way the scheme has facilitated the transfer of food grains from surplus to deficit areas within the state (Lavanya, 2023).

The AAY does not compromise on the upliftment of the most disadvantaged sections of society. It embodies the right to food, rations, and other necessities, to social protection and good health, and to a life of dignity, and Antyodaya is intended to help reduce the widening social and economic disparities in society (Pravesh & Gajendra, 2021).

Table 5. Wheat and Rice Distribution Through the Public Distribution System

Sl. No.	States/ UTs	Wheat (MT)	Rice (MT)
1	Andhra Pradesh	645.5	144473.9
2	Arunachal Pradesh	0	4067.63
3	Assam	0	97897.48
4	Bihar	86638.03	0
5	Chhattisgarh	0	112131.63
6	Goa	0	2532.43
7	Gujarat	66706.47	99261.14
8	Haryana	59903.32	0
9	Himachal Pradesh	8738.71	7410.05
10	Jammu and Kashmir	9485.52	25355.04
11	Jharkhand	26641.55	109706.51
12	Karnataka	0	162666.12
13	Kerala	13396.77	66718.82
14	Manipur	0	7703.44
15	Madhya Pradesh	106447.12	159478.9
16	Maharashtra	121979.63	215362.27
17	Meghalaya	0	10135.57
18	Mizoram	0	3920.94
19	Nagaland	0	5783.94
20	Odisha	0.45	184900.77
21	Punjab	213946.48	0
22	Rajasthan	215922.05	0
23	Sikkim	0	1570.02
24	Tamil Nadu	4292.42	197405.48
25	Telangana	0	98029.7
26	Tripura	0	13328.62
27	Uttar Pradesh	313736.72	468973.34
28	Uttarakhand	9878.55	15934.31
29	West Bengal	126972.82	190471.27
30	Andaman Nicobar Islands	43.06	299.83
31	Goa	0	2532.43
32	Dadra Nagar Haveli	242.02	2341.12
33	Daman Diu	242.02	2341.12
34	NCT Delhi	0	0
35	Ladakh	356.8	286.71
36	Lakshadweep	0	0
37	Puducherry	0	0

Source: Map view of wheat and rice distribution, Department of Food and Public Distribution, Government of India, as on 01/03/2025.

Among the Indian states, Uttar Pradesh distributed the largest quantities of wheat and rice through the public distribution system, at 313736.72 MT and 468973.34 MT respectively. Among the union territories, Jammu and Kashmir distributed the most, with 9485.52 MT of wheat and 25355.04 MT of rice. Kerala distributed 13396.77 MT of wheat and 66718.82 MT of rice to its beneficiaries. Some states and union territories distribute only wheat and others only rice, while the National Capital Territory of Delhi distributes neither wheat nor rice through its PDS.

7.10. Annapurna Scheme

The Annapurna scheme was launched by the Ministry of Rural Development in 2000-2001 and provides eligible recipients with 10 kg of free food grains, such as rice or wheat, each month, distributed through the Department of Food and Public Distribution. Part of the National Social Assistance Programme, the scheme assists widows, the elderly, persons with disabilities, and families that have lost a principal earner. The primary objective of this central-sector scheme is to provide food assistance, with the states given discretion over beneficiary selection and the mode of implementation, and it seeks to build a more just and better-nourished society by giving food security to senior citizens aged 65 and above (Pratishtha, 2025).

To qualify, an applicant must be at least 65 years old and have no regular source of income. Recipients are selected by the Gram Sabha, and their entitlement cards are issued by the Gram Panchayat. The scheme is implemented by the State Departments of Food and Civil Supplies at the state level and by the Zila Panchayat and the District Collector or Chief Executive Officer at the district level, with the gram panchayats explaining its provisions. Once the cost of the grain has been paid at the central issue price (CIP), food grains are distributed district by district by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and the Department of Food and Civil Supplies (Ministry of Rural Development, 2000).

Table 6. Details of Funds Allocated to various States and Union Territories under Annapurna Scheme during the Last Five Years (Funds released in Lakhs)

SL. No.	States/ UTs	2019 2020	2020 2021	2021 2022	2022 2023	2023 2024
1	Andhra Pradesh	378.24	283.42	383.42	496.18	72.18
2	Arunachal Pradesh	93.07	93.07	93.07	97.65	0.00
3	Assam	494.74	494.74	494.74	519.06	0.00
4	Bihar	1159.35	1175.22	1175.22	1520.85	221.24
5	Chhattisgarh	168.38	170.68	170.68	220.88	32.13
6	Goa	2.92	2.96	2.96	3.83	0.56
7	Gujarat	108.50	109.98	109.98	142.33	20.70
8	Haryana	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
9	Himachal Pradesh	18.40	18.65	18.65	24.14	3.51
10	Jammu and Kashmir	71.12	40.68	40.68	40.68	4.24
11	Jharkhand	382.31	387.55	387.55	501.52	72.96
12	Karnataka	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
13	Kerala	256.81	260.33	260.33	336.89	49.01
14	Manipur	64.90	64.90	64.90	68.09	0.00
15	Madhya Pradesh	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
16	Maharashtra	751.56	761.85	761.85	985.90	143.42
17	Meghalaya	69.98	69.98	69.98	73.43	0.00
18	Mizoram	19.55	19.55	19.55	20.51	0.00
19	Nagaland	50.83	50.83	50.83	53.33	0.00
20	Odisha	450.93	457.11	457.11	591.54	86.05
21	Punjab	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
22	Rajasthan	330.55	335.07	335.07	433.62	63.08
23	Sikkim	18.77	18.77	18.77	19.69	0.00
24	Tamil Nadu	461.98	468.31	468.31	606.04	88.16
25	Telangana	270.32	274.03	274.03	354.62	51.59
26	Tripura	112.21	112.21	112.21	117.73	0.00
27	Uttar Pradesh	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
28	Uttarakhand	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
29	West Bengal	452.80	459.00	459.00	593.99	86.41
30	Andaman Nicobar Islands	4.84	2.88	2.88	2.88	0.17
31	Chandigarh	3.81	2.26	2.26	2.26	0.13
32	Dadra Nagar Haveli	3.79	2.25	2.25	2.25	0.11
33	Daman Diu	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
34	NCT Delhi	69.56	35.56	35.56	35.56	3.70
35	Ladakh		5.26	5.26	5.26	0.31
36	Lakshadweep	0.52	0.31	0.31	0.31	0,02
37	Puducherry	13.67	6.99	6.99	6.99	0.73
	Total	6284.41	6284.40	6284.40	7878.00	1000.00

Source: Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, Lok Sabha Unstarred question No 2304, Annexure 1, answered on 06/08/2024.

As the table shows, the highest allocation under the Annapurna scheme to the states and union territories, including Kerala, over the five years from 2019-2020 to 2023-2024 was in 2022-2023, at 78.78 crore, and the lowest was in 2023-2024,

at 10 crore. Over the whole period, the largest allocation went to Bihar, at 52.5188 crore. For Kerala, the highest allocation was 336.89 lakhs in 2022-2023; the same amount, 260.33 lakhs, was allocated in both 2020-2021 and 2021-2022; and the lowest was 49.01 lakhs in 2023-2024. Among the north-eastern states, the largest allocation went to Assam (20.0328 crore) and the smallest to Sikkim (76 lakhs), while among the union territories the highest went to Delhi (1.7994 crore) and the lowest, zero, to Daman and Diu.

VIII. CONCLUSION

India's social security system provides a comprehensive framework designed to offer financial assistance and a range of social protections to the people, especially the vulnerable sections of society. In keeping with the vision of a welfare state enshrined in the Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV, Articles 36 to 51 of the Constitution of India), this paper has examined the development of social security in India, including its several phases and the constitutional basis for social protection. It has surveyed the country's major social security policies, programmes, and schemes, among them the NSAP, PDS, PMAY, PMJJBY, PMSBY, APY, PMJDY, NRHM, ESIS, DAYNRLM, PMUYS, RSBY, ICDS, and MGNREGA, drawing on the most recent available data to describe their implementation status. Taken together, these measures reveal a system that has expanded considerably in scope; the central challenges that remain are to widen coverage to the unorganised majority, to reduce administrative and technological barriers, and to ensure that benefits reach the most vulnerable in full and on time.

REFERENCES

Ajith, S. (2021). *Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana Gramin–Urban schemes and features*. *International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews, 8*(2), 720–727.

Anvish, K. (2024, July 15). *Evaluating the impact of the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana: Insights from rural Bihar*. *International Journal of Multidisciplinarity, 9*(7), 237–242.

Ashutosh, R. S., Rajan, P., Raut, A., Srivastava, A., & Singh, R. (2023). Profile of National Rural Livelihood Mission beneficiaries in Madhya Pradesh. *Asian Journal of Agricultural Extension, Economics and Sociology, 41*(11), 249–257.

Balamurugan. (2022). Awareness of Atal Pension Yojana among college students. *South Asian Journal of Social Studies and Economics, 16*(4), 1–9.

Chinmay, K., & Tollawalla, N. (2022). A descriptive study on Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana and Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana insurance schemes of the Indian government (Surat region). *International Journal of Research Publication and Reviews, 3*(4), 837–842.

Elics, R. M. (2024). Exploring trends in social security management: A bibliometric review. *Social Security Management Journal, 1*(1), 1–4.

Himadri, H., & Koley, J. (2024). The Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana scheme in India: A study. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 29*(3), 15–20.

Jean, D. (2017). Recent social security initiatives in India. *World Development, 98*.

Kumar, J. S., & Shobana, D. (2024). A study on evaluation and implementation of Indian social security programs and initiatives in India. *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 8*(3), 794–805.

Lavanya, A. (2023). Antyodaya: A socialistic principle of the Indian right wing. *International Journal of Law, Management and Humanities, 6*(6), 1837–1844.

Mukul, A. G. (2020). *Pradhan Mantri Vaya Vandhana Yojana: A laudable pension scheme*. *Economics*. https://myind.net/Home/author%20Archives/2593

Patil, H. S. (2021). A study on National Rural Livelihood Mission: A government initiative for women empowerment. *Research Gate, 51*(1), 1–11.

Pratishtha, P. (2025). A comparative analysis of the Indira Rasoi Yojana and Annapurna Scheme. *International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research, 7*(2), 1–10.

Pravesh, K., & Gajendra. (2021). Deendayal Upadhyaya's philosophy of Antyodaya: A way to protect from economic and social injustice in the COVID period. *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Education and Research, 6*(4), 44–48.

Rajasekhar, D. (2020). *Social security for unorganised workers in India* (pp. 23–24).

Rajesh, S. K. (2018). Impact of publicly financed health insurance scheme (RSBY) from equity and efficiency perspectives. *SAGE Journal, 43*(4), 191–203.

Sant, A. L., & Kundu, A. (2018). Atal Pension Yojana: A critical appraisal. *Economic and Political Weekly, 53*(19).

Saritha, L. K. (2022). Social security needs and benefits in India: A constitutional basis. *International Journal of Law, 8*(6), 161–164.

Zubin, S. C., Roberts, M. J., & Reich, M. R. (2015). Agenda setting and policy adoptions of India's National Health Insurance Scheme: Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana. *Health Systems & Reform, 1*(2), 107–118.

Ministry of Rural Development. (2000). *Guidelines for Annapurna Scheme*. New Delhi.

Comptroller and Auditor General of India. (2019). *Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana*. New Delhi.